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A. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case 
I. Introductory Note to the Fisheries Case 
The Norwegian government, by its Decree of July 12, 1935, 
established the limits of a Norwegian fisheries zone along the 
coast of Norway north of latitude 66° 28.8' North. The limits of 
this zone were measured by perpendiculars drawn from the outer 
islands in the skjaergaard, or belt of islands and rocks along the 
Norwegian coast and from base lines drawn between these islands, 
or from base lines drawn between the headlands of certain bays. 
It was Norway's position that the fisheries zone delimited by this 
Decree was her territorial sea. On September 28, 1949, the govern-
: me'nt of the United Kingdom filed with the registry of the Inter-
national Court of Justice an Application asking that the legality of 
this delimitation be tested under the principles of international 
law. That Norway claims a four-mile belt of territorial waters was 
not an issue in the case. Judgment, rendered by the Court on 
December 18, 1951, was in favor of the Norwegian position. 
Twelve of the Court's fifteen judges participated in the decision. 
Judges Fabela (Mexico) and Krylov (U.S.S.R.) were absent and 
Judge Azevedo (Brazil) had recently died. In view of the im-
portance of this case for the law of the sea, there are reproduced 
herein the Judgment of the Court, the individual concurring opin-
ions of Judge Alvarez (Chile) and Judge Hsu Mo (China), and the 
dissenting opinion of Judge McNair (United Kingdom). It is 
regretted that space limitations prevent the reprinting of the dis-
senting opinion of Judge Read (Canada) as well. In brief sum-
mary, it was his opinion that certain of the base lines were 
contrary to international law, that the Norwegian base-line "sys-
tem" was contrary to international law, and that the coastline 
rule was an established rule of international law. In general ap-
proach, his views resembled Judge MeN air's, although he agreed 
with the majority of the Court on Indreleia and Vestfj or d. He 
differed also with Judge McNair by expressing the opinion that 
the ten-mile rule for bays was established international law. 
Furthermore, he was of the opinion that the United Kingdom 
had not been shown to have acquiesced in the application of the 
Norwegian "system." Judge Read's dissenting opinion appears 
in I.C.J., Reports, 1951, pages 186-206. 
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Judge Hackworth (U.S.A.) concurred in the Judgment of the 
Court but recorded that he did so on the basis that Norway had 1 
proved a historic title to the disputed areas. 
Immediately following this Introductory Note appears a Bib-
liographical Note summarizing the voluminous discussion this case 
has generated. Consequently, the following comments will be con-
fined to a few salient points. There can be no question that the 
decision is one of the most important ever rendered by an inter-
national tribunal. Its significance for the law of the sea is evident. 
It will particularly affect the practice of States with respect to 
the methods for measuring base lines as well as having a significant 
impact on the extent of internal and territorial waters. It will also 
have some bearing on national claims to the continental shelf and 
fisheries. Even though the decision is not technically a precedent 
binding in future cases, it has already influenced and will con-
tinue to influence in practice the claims of States and the reactions 
of other States to such claims. 
The Court's opinion is brief and not as explicit as would 
have been desirable in view of the importance of the questions · 
raised. As a composite opinion of judges of varying nationalities 
and legal training, this is perhaps to be expected. It is clear, how-
ever, that the decision adopts a broad test of reasonableness in 
judging the claims of coastal States to the breadth of their ter-
ritorial sea and the means adopted by them for measuring the 
base lines which serve as the boundary between territorial and 
internal waters. While the Court emphasized that the claims of 
coastal States are governed by international law, the standards 
laid down are somewhat indefinite, and are partially subjective 
in character. Account is taken, for example, of important economic 
interests of a region's inhabitants, of sufficiently long standing, 
as a factor along with geographic and historic considerations bear-
ing on the reasonableness of the claim. The limitations on the use 
of this subjective factor are carefully stated by the International 
Law Commission in Article 5, Paragraph 1, fourth sentence, and 
Paragraph 4 of the Commentary thereto, both reprinted, infra. 
While frequent reference is made to the asserted unique character 
of the Norwegian coast, the decision will inevitably have broader 
implications. 
Thus, the Court's opinion makes clear that the so-called coast-
line rule can no longer be regarded as having any universal 
validity. Neither the three-mile rule nor the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea in general were, however, directly at issue in the 
case. Only future adjudications can delineate the limits of the , 
Court's principles with a·ny certainty. The treatment of the histor-
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ical evidence in the opinion of the Court was particularly terse. 
The ruling of the Court that the United Kingdom had acquiesced in 
the N orwegia'n "system" is subject to question. If followed, it 
will put a heavy burden in the future on States to discover the 
legislation of other States and to protest promptly if the legislation 
is objectionable. With the lack of compulsory jurisdiction in inter-
national tribunals, this will tend to encourage the growth of dis-
putes without adequate means for resolution. This tendency is 
already evident in claims that have been made before and since 
the decision. For example, the claim of Chile-Ecuador-Peru to a 
maritime zone of 200 miles has been challenged by the United 
States and other States. The United States has formally proposed 
that these differences of view be submitted to the International 
Court of Justice for decision. Chile-Ecuador-Peru, which have not 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of that Court, have not been 
willing to agree to the United States proposal. Despite the sweep 
of the Court's decision, there can be little doubt that the decision 
does not justify such extravagant claims as Chile-Ecuador-Peru 
and some other States have made. The International Law Com-
mission's 1956 Report, reprinted, infra, takes this position in 
Article 3, Paragraph 2, in stating that international law does not 
permit an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles. 
The concurring opinion of Judge Alvarez may make explicit the 
rationale of the opinion of the Court. It is probable that it goes 
beyond the Court in what· it would accept in the way of claims by 
coastal States. It too, however, acknowledges the supremacy of 
international law and, in invoking the principle of abus de droit 
as a limitation, in essence adopts a very broad standard of rea-
sonableness for judging the validity of coastal State claims. 
Despite the criticisms that have been made of various aspects 
of the Court's opinion, the decision itself has considerable merit. 
On the particular facts involved, the result reached is under-
standable and not unreasonable. The United Kingdom case was 
based on a series of detailed and complex rules for which it was 
difficult to marshal convincing support in the practice of States. 
The standard of reasonableness, while vague, is sufficiently precise 
to serve as a basis for resolution of the conflicting claims of States 
to the use of the sea. If the international society had reached the 
stage of development in which legislative and judicial organs com-
parable to the modern state existed, the standards laid down by 
. the Court would be adequate. Under existing conditions, it will be 
difficult to resolve the conflicts already present as well as the 
further disputes apt to be encouraged by the decision. 
The possible effect of the decision on claims to internal and 
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territorial waters has been mentioned. It is generally asserted that 
national sovereignty is supreme in internal waters. A striking 
aspect of the Fisheries decision is its practical effect, through 
approval of the straight-line method, in turning large areas of 
water previously considered as high or territorial seas into internal 
waters. Does it necessarily follow that there should be no right 
of innocent passage for normal navigational routes through such 
internal waters? This question was not decided in the Fisheries 
case. But Article 5, Paragraph 3, of the final Report of the_ 
International Law Commission on the Law of the Sea, reprinted, 
infra, provides in such cases that a right of innocent passage 
shall be recognized if the waters involved have normally been 
used for international traffic. 
The effect of the decision on the rights of belligerents and 
neutrals in the latter's territorial waters should be noted. Although 
the controversy concerned the validity of base li'nes for fishing 
grounds, the case was argued and decided on the basis of territorial 
waters. Consequently, if the usual assumption is made that the 
same limits and rules apply to the wartime situation, the decision 
could have serious consequences in this aspect of the subject. The 
possible implications are discussed, supra, in Situation I. 
2. Bibliographical Note to Fisheries Case 
In addition to the official report in I.C.J. Reports, 1951, pages 
116-206, the Judgment of the Court, with minor omissions, is print-
ed in 46 A.J.I.L. (1952), pages 348-370. The written and oral argu-
ments and many documents appear in I.C.J.-Pleadings, Oral 
Arguments, Documents, Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. N-or-
way) in four volumes. A fifth volume contains maps of the dis-
puted areas in detail, which are marked to show the respective 
contentions of the parties. 
Comment on the case has been voluminous. Selected references 
to this commentary will be made. Counsel on both sides have been 
especially active in recording their reactions to the case and the 
decision. Professor Waldock, of counsel for the United Kingdom, 
discusses the case at length in 28 B.Y.B. (1951), pages 114-171. 
He concludes his criticism by stating that the Court's views were 
against the weight of state practice and juristic opinion without 
adequate explanation, and that disputed issues of fact were decided 
without referring to the facts adduced in opposition. He criticizes 
the vagueness of the Court's formula, and regrets its effect in en-
couraging expansion of inland waters by unilateral claims. Wilber-
force, also of cou'nsel for the United Kingdom, emphasizes the 
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evidentiary problems in the case from the standpoint of the prac-
tising lawyer, in 1952 Transactions of the Grotius Society, pages 
151-168. Johnson, similarly of counsel for the United Kingdom, 
discusses the opposing contentions and the various opinions in 
1 l.C.L.Q. (1952), pages 145-180. He regards the decision as not 
unreasonable if the premise that there was no existing rule of 
customary law was valid. He criticizes various aspects of the 
decision, and regrets that the only dissents were by British Com-
monwealth judges. A note by Johnson on the bearing of the 
decision on the Tidelands dispute in the United States appears 
in Ibid., page 213. 
Bourquin, counsel for Norway, discusses the case in detail, in 
22 Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium 101 et seq. (1952). Among 
other points, he believes the ten-mile rule for bays was the great 
victim of the decision, and that the implications of this point 
further enfeebled the three-mile rule for territorial waters, even 
though it was not at issue. He concedes the dangers of abuse in 
the economic-interests factor but argues that the Court's limita-
tions on its use provide adequate protection. He stresses the 
connection of waters to the land as the key to use of the Court's 
formula for base lines. He defends the Court's decision as based 
on practice showing customary law under Article 38 of its Statute, 
and argues that the British position was based on proposed legis-
lative solutions. Moreover, on the merits, the British position 
sought uniformity in an area where flexibility is essential. He 
concludes his defense of the Court's position by stressing the safe-
guards against abuse in the Court's formulation, and that the 
Court itself in future cases will furnish the requisite protection. 
Unfortunately, he does not discuss the lack of compulsory juris-
diction, which could easily make this safeguard illusory in practice. 
Evenson, retained as an expert for the N orwegia'n Government 
in the case, summarizes the contentions of the parties and the 
opinions in 46 A.J.l.L. (1952), pages 609-629. He concludes that 
the decision throws doubt on the three-mile rule, implicitly accepts 
the four-mile claim, and was most significant in treating the 
Indreleia as internal waters. He believes that the decision will 
permit the extension of the Norwegian "system" to its entire coast, 
as has in fact been done. See Norway, Section VI, B, 26, infra. He 
does not believe the decision supports the more extreme claims 
that have been made. 
Professor, now Judge, Lauterpacht, criticizes the decision and 
its effect on international judicial settlement in a letter to ·The 
Times of London, January 8, 1952, page 7, Cols. 6 and 7. There is 
64 
also a brief discussion of the case in Oppenheim (8th Ed., 1955, 
Vol. I, Peace, by Lauterpacht) at pages 488-490. Professor H.A. 
Smith has discussed the decision in the Supplement to the Second 
Edition (1954) of his The Law and Guston~ of the Sea, at pages 
217-222, and in the 1953 Year Book of World Affairs, pages 
283-307. In the former, he expresses the opinion that the United 
Kingdom position had little chance of acceptance and that the 
decision will have wide effect and in fact embodies state practice 
since 1930. He concludes that the three-mile rule is no longer law-
and every state is now free to draw its limits subject to the test 
of reasonableness. In the latter, a more extensive article, he ap-
proves the decision and discusses the limitations of international 
judicial settlement in commenting on the views of Johnson, supra, 
with which he disagrees. Fitzmaurice, Legal Adviser to the British 
Foreign Office, discusses the broader implications of the decision 
under various juridical rubrics in 30 B.Y.B. (1953), pages 1-70, 
at pages 8-54. The decision itself is analyzed exhaustively by him 
in 31 Ibid. (1954), pages 371-429. His conclusions on delimitation 
as determined by the Court appear at pages 426-428. It is too 
detailed to summarize briefly but in general may be said to draw 
narrower implications from the decision than Smith, supra, and 
some other commentators have drawn. There is a brief comment 
by L.C. Green in 15 Modern Law Review 373 (July 1952) and by 
Honig in 102 Law Journal 397 (July 1952). The Parliamentary 
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated that the effect 
of the decision on British practice was being considered, taking 
account of fisheries conventions to which the United Kingdom· is 
a party. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 175 Official 
Reports (No. 25, 1952), Tuesday, February 19, 1952, Cols. 
7 and 8. See Section VI, 35, b, 1, infra, for text of later official 
Statement. 
Judge Hudson summarizes the opinions and expresses approval 
of the decisio'n in 46 A.J.I.L. (1952), pages 23-30. He states, in 
part: "* * * The judgment of the Court, supported by a firm 
majority, takes high place in the annals of international juris-
prudence. It paves the way for a much sounder approach to the 
subject of territorial waters * * * and it clears up many of the 
confusions * * * ." Ibid., page 30. Young comments briefly on 
the case in 38 American Bar Association Journal 243 (March 
1952), and concludes that any reasonable moderate delimitation 
would be valid. The decision is approved in a note in 65 Harvard 
La~v Review 1453 (June 1952). A comment stressing the implica-
tions of the decision for the United States appears in 4 Stanford 
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Law Review 546-558 (July 1952). McDougal and Schlei cite the 
decision in support of their standard of reasonableness for the law 
of the sea in general in 64 Yale Law Journal 648 (April 1955) at 
page 658, note 62, and page 665. Vaughan, 42 Geographical Re-
view 302 ( 1952) summarizes the decision and points out the need 
that will arise for delineation on maps of exact limits which 
surface navigators and aviators can use. 
Auby approves of the decision in general, although he criticizes 
the Court's opinion on the acquiescence and notice points. Some 
of his comments are too sweeping, especially his treatment of 
the Truman Proclamations, infra, Section VI, A, Journal du Droit 
International (Clunet-80th Year-No. 1), commencing on page 
24 in French and page 25 in English). Brinton comments on the 
decision and applies it to the 1951 Egyptian Royal Decree of 15 
January 1951 and to the Icelandic and Bulgarian laws in 8 Revue 
Egyptienne de Droit International 103 (1952) at pages 104-112. 
The Bulgarian, Egyptian, and Icelandic laws, which are discussed, 
infra, Section VI, B, 4, 13, and 18, resemble in various degrees 
the Norwegian "system''. There is a brief comment on the case 
by the New Zeala'nd Department of External Affairs in 28 Uni-
versity of New Zealand La~v Journal (July 22, 1952), at page 
201. The conclusion is that the rigidity of the freedom of the seas 
must yield to an orderly regime consistent with the needs of the 
international community. 
3. Judgment (Opinion of the Court) 
Present: President BASDEVANT; Vice-President GUER-
RERO; Judges ALVAREZ, HACKWORTH, WINIAR-
SKI, ZORICIC, DE VISSCHER, Sir Arnold McNAIR, 
KLAESTAD, BADAWI PASHA, READ, HSU MO; 
Registrar HAMBRO. 
In the Fisheries case, 
between 
the United Kingdom of ' Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
· represented by: 
Sir Eric Beckett, K.C.M.G., K.C., Legal Adviser to the Foreign 
Office, 
as Agent, 
assisted by : 
The Right Honourable Sir Frank Soskice, K.C., M.P., Attorney-
General, 
Professor C.H.M. Waldock, C.M.G., O.B.E~, K.C., Chichele Pro-
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fessor of Public International Law in the University of 
Oxford, 
Mr. R.O. Wilberforce, Member of the English Bar, 
Mr. D.H.N. Johnson, Assistant Legal Advisor, Foreign Office, 
as Counsel, 
and by: 
Commander R.H. Kennedy, O.B.E., R.N. (retired), Hydro-
graphic Department, Admiralty, 
Mr. W.H. Evans, Hydrographic Department, Admiralty, 
M. Annaeus Schjodt, Jr., of the Norwegian Bar, Legal Adviser 
to the British Embassy in Oslo. 
Mr. W.N. Hanna, Military Branch, Admiralty, 
Mr. A.S. Armstro·ng, Fisheries Department, Ministry of Agri-
culture and Fisheries, 
as expert advisers; 
and 
the Kingdom of Norway, 
represented by: 
M. Sven Arntzen, Advocate at the Supreme Court of Norway, 
as Agent and Counsel, 
assisted by : 
M. Maurice Bourquin, Professor at the University of Geneva 
and at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, 
as Counsel, 
and by: 
M. Paal Berg, former President of the Supreme Court of 
Norway, 
Mr. C. J. Hambro, President of the Odelsting, 
M. Frede Castberg, Professor at the University of Oslo, 
M. Lars J. J or.stad, Minister Plenipotentiary, 
Captain Chr. Meyer, of the Norwegian Royal Navy, 
M. Gunnar Rollefsen, Director of the Research Bureau of the 
Norwegian Department of Fisheries, 
M. Reidar Skau, Judge of the Supreme Court of Norway, 
M.E.A. Col ban, Chief of Division in the Norwegian Royal 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 
Captain W. Coucheron-Aamot, of the Norwegian Royal Navy, 
M. J ens Eve·nsen, of the Bar of the Norwegian Courts of Appeal, 
M. Andre Salomon, Doctor of Law, 
as experts, 
and by: 
M. Sigurd Ekeland, Secretary to the Norwegian Royal Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs, 
as secretary, 
THE COURT, 
composed as above, 
delivers the following Judgment: 
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On September 28th, 1949, the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland filed in the Registry 
an Application instituting proceedings before the Court against 
the Kingdom of Norway, the subject of the proceedings being the 
validity or otherwise, under international law, of the lines of 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down by the 
Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, as amended by a Decree of 
December lOth, 1937, for that part of Norway which is situated 
northward of 66 o 28.8' (or 66 o 28' 48") N. latitude. The .Applica-
tion refers to the Declarations by which the United Kingdom and 
Norway have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
in accordance with Article 36, paragraph 2, of the Statute. 
This Application asked the Court 
"(a) to declare the principles of international law to 
be applied in defining the base-lines, by reference to 
which the Norwegian Government is entitled to delimit 
a fisheries zone, extending to sea ward 4 sea miles from 
those lines and exclusively reserved for its own nationals, 
and to define the said base-lines in so far as it appears 
necessary, in the light of the arguments of the Parties, 
in order to avoid further legal differences between them; 
(b) to award damages to the Government of the United 
Kingdom in respect of all interferences by the Norwegian 
authorities with British fishing vessels outside the zone 
which, in accordance with the Court's decision under (a), 
the Norwegian Government is entitled to reserve for its 
nationals." 
Pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute, the Applica-
tion was notified to the States entitled to appear before the Court. 
It was also transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations. 
The Pleadings were filed within the time-limits prescribed by 
Order of November 9th, 1949, and later extended by Orders of 
March 29th and October 4th, 1950, and January lOth, 1951. By 
application of Article 44, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court, they 
were communicated to the Governments of Belgium, Canada, Cuba, 
Iceland, Sweden, the United States of America and Venezuela, at 
·their request and with the authorization of the Court. On Septem-
ber 24th, 1951, the Court, by aJ?plication of Article 44, paragraph 
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3, of the Rules, at the instance of the Government o£ Norway, and 
with the agreement of the United Kingdom Government, au-
thorized the Pleadings to be made accessible to the public. 
The case was ready for hearing on April 30th, 1951, and the 
opening of the oral proceedings was fixed for September 25th, 
1951. Public hearings were held on September 25th, 26th, 27th, 
28th and 29th, October 1st, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th, lOth, 11th, 12th, 
13th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th and 29th. _ 
In the course of the hearings, the Court heard Sir Eric Beckett, 
Agent, Sir Frank Soskice, Mr. Wilberforce and Professor W aldock, 
Counsel, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government; and M. 
Arntzen, Agent and Counsel, and Professor Bourquin, Counsel, 
on behalf of the Government of Norway. In addition, technical 
explanations were given on behalf of the United Kingdom Govern-
ment by Commander Kennedy. 
At the end of his argument, the Agent of the United Kingdom 
Government presented the following submissions: 
"The United Kingdom submits that the Court should 
decide that the maritime limits which Norway is entitled 
to enforce as against the United Kingdom should be 
drawn in accordance with the following principles: 
( 1) That Norway is entitled to a belt of territorial 
waters of fixed breadth-the breadth cannot, as a maxi-
mum, exceed 4 sea miles. 
(2) That, in consequence, the outer limit of Norway's 
territorial waters must never be more than 4 sea miles 
from some point on the base-line. 
(3) That, subject to (4), (9) and (10) below, the 
base-line must be low-water mark on permanently dry 
land (which is part of Norwegian territory) or the 
proper closing line (see (7) below) of Norwegian in-
ternal waters. 
( 4) That, where there is a low-tide elevation situated 
within 4 sea miles of permanently dry land, or of the 
proper closing line of Norwegian internal \Vaters, the 
outer limit of territorial waters may be 4 sea miles from 
the outer edge (at low tide) of this low-tide elevation. In 
no other case may a low-tide elevation be taken into 
account. 
(5) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian 
internal waters, on historic grounds, all fjords and sunds 
which fall within the conception of a bay as defined in 
internatio·nal law, whether the proper entrance to the 
indentation is more or less than 10 sea miles wide. 
( 6) That the definition of a bay in international law 
is a well-marked indentation, whose penetration inland 
is in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to co·n-
stitute the indentation more than a mere curvature of the 
coast. 
(7) That, where an area of water is a bay, the prin-
ciple which determines where the closing line should be 
drawn, is that the closing line should be drawn between 
the natural geographical entrance points where the in-
de·ntation ceases to have the configuration of a bay. 
(8) That a legal strait is any geographical strait which 
connects two portions of the high seas. 
(9) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian 
territorial waters, on historic grounds, all the waters of 
the fjords and sunds which have the character of a legal 
strait. Where the maritime belts, drawn from each shore, 
overlap at each end of the strait, the limit of territorial 
waters is formed by the outer rims of these two mari-
time belts. Where, however, the maritime belts so drawn 
do not overlap, the limit follows the outer rims of each of 
these two maritime belts, until they intersect with the 
straight line, joining the natural entrance points of the 
strait, after which intersection the limit follows that 
straight line. 
(10) That, in the case of the Vestfjord, the outer 
limit of Norwegian territorial waters, at the south-
westerly end of the fjord, is the pecked green line shown 
on Charts Nos. 8 and 9 of Annex 35 of the Reply. 
(11) That Norway, by reason of her historic title to 
fjords and sunds, is entitled to claim, either as territorial 
or as internal waters, the areas of water lying between 
the island fringe and ~he mainland of Norway. In order 
to determine what areas must be deemed to lie between 
the islands and the mainland, and whether these areas are 
territorial or internal waters, recourse must be had to 
Nos. (6) and (8) above, being the definitions of a bay 
and of a legal strait. 
(12) That Norway is not entitled, as against the 
United Kingdom, to enforce any claim to waters not 
covered by the preceding principles. As between Norway 
and the United Kingdom, waters off the coast of Norway 
north of parallel 66° 28.8' N., which are not Norwegian 
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by virtue of the above-mentioned principles, are high 
seas. 
(13) That Norway is under an inter'national obliga-
tion to pay to the United Kingdom compensation in re-
spect of all the arrests since 16th September, 1948, of 
British fishing vessels in waters, which are high seas by 
virtue of the application of the preceding principles." 
Later, the Agent of the United Kingdom Government presented -
the following Conclusions, at the end of his oral reply: 
"The United Kingdom submits that the Court should 
decide that the maritime limits which Norway is en-
titled to enforce as against the United Kingdom should 
be drawn in accordance with the following principles : 
(1) That Norway is entitled to a belt of territorial 
waters of fixed breadth-the breadth cannot, as a maxi-
mum, exceed 4 sea miles. 
(2) That, in consequence, the outer limit of Norway's 
territorial waters must never be more than 4 sea miles 
from some point o'n the base-line. 
(3) That, subject to Nos. (4), (9) and (10) below, 
the base-line must be low-water mark on permanently 
dry land (which is part of Norwegian territory) or the 
proper closing line (see No. (7) below) of Norwegian 
internal waters. 
( 4) That, where there is a low-tide elevation situated 
within 4 sea miles of permanently dry land, or of the 
proper closing line of Norwegian internal waters, the 
outer limit of Norwegian territorial waters may be 4 
sea miles from the outer edge (at low tide) of this low-
tide elevation. In no other case may a low-tide elevation 
be taken into account. 
( 5) That Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian 
internal waters, on historic grounds, all fjords and sunds 
which fall within the conception of a bay as defined in in-
ternational law (see No. (6) below), whether the proper 
closing line of the indentation is more or less than 10 
sea miles long. 
(6) That the definition of a bay in international law 
is a well-marked indentation, whose penetration inland is 
in such proportion to the width of its mouth as to con-
stitute the indentation more than a mere curvature of 
the coast. 
(7) That, where an area of water is a bay, the prin-
ciple which determines where the closing line should be 
drawn, is that the closing line should be drawn between 
the natural geographical entrance points where the in-
dentation ceases to have the configuration of a bay. 
( 8) That a legal strait is any geographical strait 
which connects two portions of the high seas. 
(9) (a) That Norway is entitled to claim as Nor-
wegian territorial waters, on historic grounds, all the 
waters of the fjords and sunds which have the character 
of legal straits. 
(b) Where the maritime belts drawn from each 
shore overlap at each end of the strait, the limit of terri-
torial waters is formed by the outer rims of these two 
maritime belts. Where, however, the maritime belts so 
drawn do not overlap, the limit follows the outer rims of 
each of these two maritime belts, until they intersect with 
the straight line, joining the natural entrance points of 
the strait, after which intersection the limit follows that 
straight line. 
(10) That, in the case of the Vestfjord, the outer limit 
of Norwegian territorial waters, at the southwesterly 
end of the fjord, is the pecked green line shown on Charts 
Nos. 8 and 9 of A·nnex 35 of the Reply. 
(11) That Norway, by reason of her historic title to 
fjords and sunds (see Nos. (5) and (9) (a) above), is 
entitled to claim, either as internal or as territorial 
waters, the areas of water lying between the island 
fringe and the mainland of Norway. In order to deter-
mine what areas must be deemed to lie between the island 
fringe and the mainland, and whether these areas are 
internal or territorial waters, the principles of Nos. ( 6), 
(7), (8) and (9) (b) must be applied to indentations 
in the island fringe and to indentations between the 
island fringe and the mainland-those areas which lie 
in indentations having -the character of bays, and within 
the proper closing lines thereof, being deemed to be 
internal waters; and those areas which lie in indenta-
tions having the character of legal straits, and within 
the proper limit thereof, being deemed to be territorial 
waters. 
(12) That Norway is not entitled, as against the 
United Kingdom, to enforce any claims to waters not 
covered by the preceding principles. As between Norway 
and the United Kingdom, waters off the coast of Norway 
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north of parallel 66 ° 28.8' N ., which are not Norwegian 
by virtue of the above-mentioned principles, are high 
seas. 
(13) That the Norwegian Royal Decree of 12th July, 
1935, is not enforceable against the United Kingdom to 
the extent that it claims as Norwegian waters (internal 
or territorial waters) areas of water not covered by Nos. 
(1)-(11). 
(14) That Norway is under an international obliga-
tion to pay to the United Kingdom compensation in 
respect of all the arrests since 16th September, 1948, of 
British fishing vessels in waters which are high seas by 
virtue of the application of the preceding principles. 
Alternatively to Nos. (1) to (13) (if the Court should 
decide to determine by its judgment the exact limits of 
the territorial waters which Norway is entitled to en-
force against the United Kingdom), that Norway is not 
entitled as against the United Kingdom to claim as Nor-
wegian waters any areas of water off the Norwegian 
coasts north of parallel 66° 28.8' N. which are outside 
the pecked green line drawn on the charts which form 
Annex 35 of the Reply. 
Alternatively to Nos. {8) to (11) (if the Court should 
hold that the waters of the Indreleia are Norwegian in-
ternal waters), the following are substituted for Nos. 
(8) to (11) : 
I. That, in the case of the Vestfjord, the outer limit 
of Norwegian territorial waters at the southwesterly 
end of the fjord is a line drawn 4 sea miles sea wards of 
a line joining the Skomvaer lighthouse at Rost to Kals-
holmen lighthouse in Tennholmerne until the intersection 
of the former line with the arcs of circles in the pecked 
green line shown on Charts 8 and 9 of Annex 35 of the 
Reply. 
II. That Norway, by reason of her historic title to 
fjords and sunds, is entitled to claim as internal waters 
the areas of water lying between the island fringe and 
the mainland of Norway. In order to determine what 
areas must be deemed to lie between the island fringe and 
the mainland, the principles of Nos. ( 6) and ( 7) above 
must be applied to the indentations in the island fringe 
and to the indentations between the island fringe and 
the mainland-those areas which lie in indentations 
having the character of bays, and within the proper 
closing lines thereof, being deemed to lie between the 
island fringe and the mainland." 
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At the end of his argument, the Norwegian Agent presented, 
on behalf of his government, the following submissions, which 
he did not modify in his oral rejoinder: 
"Having regard to the fact that the Norwegian Royal 
Decree of July 12th, 1935, is not inconsistent with the 
rules of international law binding upon Norway, and 
having regard to the fact that Norway possesses, in 
any event, an historic title to all the waters included 
within the limits laid down by that decree, 
May it please the Court, 
in one single judgment, 
rejecting all submissions to the contrary, 
to adjudge and declare that the delimitation of the 
fisheries zone fixed by the Norwegian Royal Decree of 
July 12th, 1935, is not contrary to international law." 
* * * 
The facts which led the United Kingdom to bring the case 
before the Court are briefly as follo\vs. 
The historical facts laid before the Court establish that as the 
result of complaints from the King of Denmark and of Nor-vvay, 
at the beginning of the seventeenth century, British fishermen 
refrained from fishing in Norwegian coastal waters for a long 
period, from 1616-1618 until 1906. 
In 1906 a few British vessels appeared off the coasts of Eastern 
Finnmark. From 1908 onwards they returned in greater numbers. 
These were trawlers equipped with improved and powerful gear. 
The local population became perturbed, and measures were taken 
by the Norwegian Government with a view to specifying the 
limits within which fishing was prohibited to foreigners. 
The first incident occurred in 1911 when a British trawler was 
seized and condemned for having violated these me~sures. N egoti-
ations ensued between the two Governments. These were inter-
rupted by the war in 1914. From 1922 onwards incidents re-
curred. Further conversations were initiated in 1924. In 1932, 
British trawlers, extending the range of their activities, appeared 
in the sectors off the Norwegian coast west of the North Cape, 
and the number of warnings and arrests increased. On July 27th, 
1933, the United Kingdom Government sent a memorandum to the 
Nor\vegian Government complaining that in delimiting the terri-
torial sea the Norwegian authorities had made use of unjustifiable 
74 
base-lines. On July 12th, 1935, a Norwegian Royal Decree was 
enacted delimiting the Norwegian fisheries zone north of 66° 28.8' 
North latitude. 
The United Kingdom made urgent representations in Oslo in 
the course of which the question of referring the dispute to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice was raised. Pending the 
result of the negotiations, the Norwegian Government made it 
known that Norwegian fishery patrol vessels would deal leniently 
with foreign vessels fishing a certain distance within the fishing-
limits. In 1948, since no agreement had been reached, the Nor-
wegian Government abandoned its lenient enforcement of the 1935 
Decree; incidents then became more and more frequent. A con-
siderable number of British trawlers were arrested and con-
demned. It was then that the United Kingdom Government in-
stituted the present proceedings. 
... 
... 
* * 
The Norwegian Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, concerning the 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone sets out in the pre-
amble the considerations on -vvhich its provisions are based. In this 
connection it refers to "well-established national titles of right", 
"the geographical conditions prevailing on the Norwegian coasts", 
"the safeguard of the vital interests of the inhabitants of the 
northernmost parts of the country"; it further relies on the Royal 
Decrees of February 22nd, 1812, October 16th, 1869, January 5th, 
1881, and September 9th, 1889. 
The Decree provides that "lines of delimitation towards ' the 
high sea of the Norwegian fisheries zone as regards that part of 
Norway which is situated northward 66° 28.8' North latitude ... 
shall run parallel with straight base-lines drawn between fixed 
points on the mainland, on islands or rocks, starting from the final 
point of the boundary line of the Realm in the easternmost part 
of the Varangerfjord and going as far as Traena in the County 
of Nordland". An appended schedule indicates the fixed points 
between which the base-lines are drawn. 
The subject of the dispute is clearly indicated under point 8 of 
the Application instituting proceedings: ''The subject of the dis-
pute is the validity or otherwise under international law of the 
lines of delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down by 
the Royal Decree of 1935 for that part of Norway which is situated 
northward of 66° 28.8' North latitude." And further on: " ... the 
question at issue between the two Governments is whether the 
lines prescribed by the Royal Decree of 1935 as the base-lines for 
the delimitation of the fisheries zone have or have not been drawn 
in accordance with the applicable rules of international law." 
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Although the Decree of July 12th, 1935, refer s to the Norwegian 
fisheries zone and does not specifically mention the territorial sea, 
there can be no doubt that the zone delimited by this Decree is 
none other than the sea area which Norway considers to be her 
territorial .sea. That is how the Parties argued the question and 
that is the way in which they submitted it to the Court for 
decision. 
The Submissions presented by the Agent of the Norwegian 
Government correspond to the subject of the dispute as indicated 
in the Application. 
The propositions formulated by the Agent of the United King-
dom Government at the end of his first speech and revised by 
him at the end of his oral reply under the heading of "Con-
clusions" are more complex in character and must be dealt with 
in detail. 
Points 1 and 2 of these "Conclusions'' refer to the extent of 
Norway's territorial sea. This question is not the subject of the 
present dispute. In fact, the 4-mile limit claimed by Norway was 
acknowledged by the United Kingdom in the course of the pro-
ceedings. 
Points 12 and 13 appear to be real Submissions which accord 
with the United Kingdom's conception of international law as set 
out under points 3 to 11. 
Points 3 to 11 appear to be a set of propositions which, in the 
form of definitions, principles or rules, purport to justify certain 
contentions and do not constitute a precise and direct statement 
of a claim. The subject of the dispute being quite concrete, the 
Court cannot entertain the suggestion made by the Agent of the 
United Kingdom Government at the sitting of October 1st, 1951, 
that the Court should deliver a Judgment which for the moment 
would confine itself to adjudicating on the definitions, principles or 
rules stated, a suggestion which, moreover, was objected to by the 
Agent of the Norwegian Government at the sitting of October 5th, 
1951. These are elements which might furnish reasons in .support 
of the Judgment, but cannot ' constitute the decision. It further 
follows that even understood in this way, these elements may be 
taken into account only in so far as they would appear to be 
relevant for deciding the sole question in dispute, namely, the 
validity or otherwise under international law of the lines of 
delimitation laid down by the 1935 Decree. 
Point 14, which seeks to secure a decision of principle concern-
ing Norway's obligation to pay to the United Kingdom compensa-
tio'n in respect of all arrests since September 16th, 1948, of British 
fishing vessels in waters found to be high seas, need not be con-
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sidered, since the Parties had agreed to leave this question to 
subsequent settlement if it should arise. 
The claim of the United Kingdom Government is founded on 
what it regards as the general international law applicable to the 
delimitation of the Norwegian fisheries zone. 
The Norwegian Government does not deny that there exist rules 
of international law to which this delimitation must conform. It 
contends that the propositions formulated by the United Kingdom 
Government in its "Conclusions" do not possess the character 
attributed to them by that Government. It further relies on its 
own system of delimitation which it asserts to be in every respect 
in conformity with the requirements of international law. 
The Court will examine in turn these various aspects of the 
claim of the United Kingdom and of the defence of the Norwegian 
Government. 
* * * 
The coastal zone concerned in the dispute is of considerable 
length. It lies north of latitude 66° 28.8' N., that is to say, north of 
the Arctic Circle, and it includes the coast of the mainland of ~ 
Norway and all the islands, islets, rocks and reefs, known by the 
name of the "skjaergaard" (literally, rock rampart), together 
with all Norwegian internal and territorial "\Vaters. The coast of 
the mainland, which, without taking any account of fjords, bays . 
and minor indentations, is over 1,500 kilometres in length, is of · 
a very distinctive configuration. Very broken along its. whole 
length, it constantly opens out into indentations often penetrating 
for great distances inland: the Porsangerfj ord, for instance, 
penetrates 75 sea miles inland. To the west, the land co:r:figuration 
stretches out into the sea: the large and small islands, moun-
tainous· in character, the islets, rocks and reefs, some always 
above water, others emerging only at low tide, are in truth but an 
extension of the Norwegian mainland. The number of insular 
formations, large and small, which make up the ''skjaergaard", is 
estimated by the Norwegian Government to be one hundred and 
twenty thousand. From the southern extremity of the disputed 
area to the North Cape, the "skj aergaard" lies along the whole of 
the coast of the mainland; east of the North Cape, the "skj aer-
gaard" ends, but the coast line continues to be broken by large 
and deeply indented fjords. 
Within the "skjaergaard", almost every island has its large 
and its small bays; countless arms of the sea, straits, channels 
and mere waterways serve as a means of communication for the 
local population which inhabits the islands as it does the main-
land. The coast of the mainland does not constitute, as it does in 
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practically all other countries, a clear dividing line between land 
and sea. What matters, what really constitutes the Norwegian 
coast line, is the outer line of the "skj aergaard". 
The whole of this region is mountainous. The North Cape, a 
sheer rock little more than 300 metres high, can be seen from a 
considerable distance; there are other summits rising to over a 
thousand metres, so that the Norwegian coast, mainland and 
"skjaergaard'', is visible from far off. 
Along the coast are situated comparatively shallow banks, 
veritable under-water terraces which constitute fishing grounds 
where fish are particularly abundant; these grounds were known 
to Norwegian fishermen and exploited by them fro1n time im-
memorial. Since these banks lay within the range of vision, the 
most desirable fishing grounds were always located and identified 
by means of the method of alignments ("meds"), at points where 
two lines drawn between points selected on the coast or on islands 
intersected. 
In these barren regions the inhabitants of the coastal zone 
derive their livelihood essentially from fishing. 
Such are the realities which must be borne in mind in appraising 
the validity of the United Kingdom contention that the limits of 
the Norwegian fisheries zone laid down in the 1935 Decree are 
contrary to international law. 
The Parties being in agreement on the figure of 4 miles for the 
breadth of the territorial sea, the problem which arises is from 
what base-line this breadth is to be reckoned. The Conclusions of 
the United Kingdom are explicit on this point: the base-line must 
be low-water mark on permanently dry land which is a part of 
Norwegian territory, or the proper closing line of Norwegian 
internal waters. 
The Court has no difficulty in finding that, for the purpose of 
measuring the breadth of the territorial sea, it is the low-water 
mark as opposed to the high-water mark, or the mean between 
the two tides, which has generally been adopted in the practice of 
States. This criterion is the most favourable to the coastal State ' 
and clearly shows the character of territorial waters as ap-
purtenant to the land territory. The Court notes that the Parties 
agree as to this criterion, but that they differ as to its application. 
The Parties also agree that in the case of a low-tide elevation 
. (drying rock) the outer edge at low water of this low-tide eleva-
tion may be taken into account as a base-point for calculating the 
breadth of the territorial sea. The Co·nclusions of the United 
Kingdom Government add a condition which is not admitted by 
Norway, namely, that, in order to be taken into account, a drying 
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rock must be situated within 4 miles of permanently dry land. 
Hcwever, the Court does not consider it necessary to deal with 
this question, inasmuch as Norway has succeeded in proving, after 
both Parties had given their interpretation of the charts, that 
in fact none of the drying rocks used by her as base points is more 
than 4 miles from permanently dry land. 
The Court finds itself obliged to decide whether the relevant 
low-water mark is that of the mainland or of the "skjaergaard". 
Since the mainland is bordered in its western sector by the-
"skjaergaard", which constitutes a whole with the mainland, it 
is the outer line of the "skjaergaard" which must be taken into 
account in delimiting the belt of Norwegian territorial waters. 
This solution is dictated by geographic realities. 
Three methods have been contemplated to effect the application 
of the low-water mark rule. The simplest would appear to be the 
method of the trace parallele, which consists of drawing the outer 
limit of the belt of territorial waters by following the coast in all 
its sinuosities. This method may be applied without difficulty to 
an ordinary coast, which is not too broken. Where a coast is deeply 
indented and cut into, as is that of Eastern Finnmark, or where 
it is bordered by an archipelago such as the "skj aergaard" along 
the western sector of the coast here in question, the base-line 
becomes independent of the low-water mark, and can only be deter-
mined by means of a geometric construction. In such circumstances 
the line of the low-water mark can no longer be put forward as a 
rule requiring the coast line to be followed in all its sinuosities; 
nor can one speak of exceptions when contemplating so rugged a 
coast in detail. Such a coast, viewed as a whole, calls for the ap-
plication of a different method. Nor can one characterize as excep-
tions to the rule the very many derogations which would be neces-
sitated by such a rugged coast. The rule would disappear under 
the exceptions.1 
It is true that the experts of the Second Sub-Committee of the 
Second Committee of the 1930 Conference for the codification of 
international law formulated the low-water mark rule somewhat 
strictly ("following all the sinuosities of the coast") . But they 
1 The last three sentences of this paragraph were somewhat distorted by 
printing errors and the following translation was later provided by the 
Registry of the International Court of Justice for the authoritative French 
text of the judgment. ·This corrected translation and an explanatory note 
appear in the Report of the International Law Com1nission, covering its 
Eighth Session, Supplement No. 9 (A/3159), p. 14. 
"[In such circumstances the line of the low-water mark can no 
longer be put forward as a rule requiring the coastline to be fol-
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were at the same time obliged to admit many exceptions relating 
to bays, islands near the coast, groups of islands. In the present 
case this method of the trace parallele, which was invoked against 
Norway in the Memorial, was abandoned in the written Reply, 
and later in the oral argument of the Agent of the United Kingdom 
Government. Consequently, it is no longer relevant to the case. 
"On the other hand", it is said in the Reply, ''the courbe tangente 
-or, in English, 'envelopes of arcs of circles' method is the method 
which the United Kingdom considers to be the correct one". 
The arcs of circles method, which is constantly used for deter-
mining the position of a point or object at sea, is a new technique 
in so far as it is a method for delimiting the territorial sea. This 
technique was proposed by the United States delegation at the 
1930 Conference for the codification of international law. Its pur-
pose is to secure the application of the principle that the belt of 
territorial waters must follow the line of the coast. It is not 
obligatory by law, as was admitted by Counsel for the United 
Kingdom Government in his oral reply. In these circumstances, 
and although certain of the Conclusions of the United Kingdom 
are founded on the application of the arcs of circles method, the 
Court considers that it need not deal with these Conclusions in so 
far as they are based upon this method. 
The principle that the belt of territorial waters must follow the 
general direction of the coast makes it possible to fix certain 
criteria valid for any delimitation of the territorial sea; these 
criteria will be elucidated later. The Court will confine itself at 
this stage to noting that, in order to apply this principle, several 
States have deemed it necessary to follow the straight base-lines 
method and that they have not encountered objections of prin-
ciple by other States. This method consists of selecting appropriate 
points on the low-water mark and drawing straight lines between 
them. This has been done, not only in the case of well-defined bays, 
but also in cases of minor curvatures of the coast line where it was 
solely a question of giving a simpler form to the belt of territorial 
waters. 
It has been contended, on behalf of the United Kingdom, that 
Norway may draw straight lines only across bays. The Court is 
lowed in all its sinuosities. Nor can one characterize as exceptions 
to the rule the very many derogations which would be necessitated 
by such a rugged coast; the rule would disappear under the excep-
tions. Such a coast, viewed as a whole, calls for the application of a 
different Inethod; that is, the method of base-lines which, with-
in reasonable limits, may depart frmn the physical line of the 
coast] . .. " 
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unable to share this view. If the belt of territorial waters must 
follow the outer line of the "skj aergaard", and if the method of 
straight base-lines must be admitted in certain cases, there is no 
valid reason to draw them only across bays, as in Eastern Finn- ' 
mark, and not also to draw them between islands, islets and rocks, 
across the sea areas separating them, even when such areas do not 
fall within the conception of a bay. It is sufficient that they should 
be situated between the island formatio·ns of the "skjaergaard'', 
inter fauces terraru11t. 
The United Kingdom Government concedes that straight lines, 
regardless of their length, may be used only subject to the condi-
tions set out in point 5 of its Conclusions, as follows: 
"Norway is entitled to claim as Norwegian internal 
waters, on historic grounds, all fjords and sunds which 
fall within the conception of a bay as defined in inter-
national law (see No. (6) below), whether the proper 
closing line of the indentation is more or less than 10 sea 
miles long." 
; 
A preliminary remark must be made in respect of this point. .1. 
In the opinion of the United Kingdom Government, Norway is 
entitled, on historic grounds, to claim as internal waters all fjords I 
and sunds which have the character of a bay. She is also entitled 
on historic grounds to claim as Norwegian territorial waters all 
the waters of the fjords and sunds which have the character of 
legal straits (Conclusions, point 9), a'nd, either as internal or as 
territorial waters, the areas of water lying between the island 
fringe and the mainland (point II and second alternative Con-
clusion II). 
By "historic waters" are usually meant waters which are treated 
as internal waters but which would not have that character were 
it ·not for the existence of an historic title. The United Kingdom 
Government refers to the notion of historic titles both in respect 
of territorial waters and internal waters, considering such titles, 
in both cases, as derogations from general international law. In its 
opinion Norway can justify the claim that these waters are 
territorial or internal on the ground that she has exercised the 
necessary jurisdiction over them for a long period without opposi-
tion from other States, a kind of possessio longi temporis, with :; 
the result that her jurisdiction over these waters must now be ; 
recognized although it constitutes a derogation from the rules in · 
force. Norwegian sovereignty over these waters would constitute 
an exception, historic titles justifying situations which would · 
otherwise be in conflict with international law. 
81 
As has been said, the United Kingdom Government concedes 
that Norway is entitled to claim as internal waters all the waters 
of fjords and sunds which fall within the conception of a bay as 
defined in international law whether the closing line of the indenta-
tion is more or less than ten sea miles long. But the United King-
dom Government concedes this only on the basis of historic title; 
it must therefore be taken that that Government has not aban-
doned its contention that the ten-mile rule is to be regarded as a 
rule of international law. 
In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point 
out that although the ten-mile rule has been adopted by certain 
States both in their national law and in their treaties and con-
ventions, and although certain arbitral decisions have applied it 
as between these States, other States have adopted a different 
limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the au-
thority of a general rule of international law. 
In any event the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable 
as against Norway inasmuch as she has always opposed any 
attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast. 
The Court now comes to the question of the length of the base-
lines drawn across the waters lying between the various forma-
tions of the "skj aergaard". Basing itself on the analogy with the 
alleged general rule of ten miles relating to bays, the United 
Kingdom Government still maintains on this point that the length 
of straight lines must not- exceed ten miles. 
· In this connection, the practice of States does not justify the 
formulation of any general rule of law. The attempts that have 
been made to subject groups of islands or coastal archipelagoes to 
conditions analogous to the limitations concerning bays (distance 
between the islands not exceeding twice the breadth of the ter-
ritorial waters, or ten or twelve sea miles), have not got beyond 
the stage of proposals. 
Furthermore, apart from any question of limiting the lines to 
ten miles, it may be that several lines can be envisaged. In such 
cases the coastal State would seem to be in the best position to 
appraise the local conditions dictating the selection. · 
Consequently, the Court is unable to share the view of the 
United Kingdom Government, that "Norway, in the matter of 
base-lines, now claims recognition of an exceptional system". As 
will be shown later, all that the Court can see therein is the 
application of general international law to a specific case. 
· The Conclusions of the United Kingdom, points 5 and 9 to 11, 
refer to waters situated between the base-lines and the Norwegian 
rpainland. The Court is asked to hold that on historic grounds 
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these waters belong to Norway, but that they are divided into two 
categories: territorial and internal waters, in accordance with 
two criteria which the Conclusions regard as well founded in 
international law, the waters falling within the conception of a bay 
being deemed to be internal waters, and those having the character 
of legal straits being deemed to be territorial waters. 
As has been conceded by the United Kingdom, the "skjaergaard" 
constitutes a whole with the Norwegian mainland; the waters 
between the base-lines of the belt of territorial waters and the -
mainland are internal waters. However, according to the argu-
ment of the United Kingdom a portion of these waters constitutes 
territorial waters. These are inter alia the waters followed by the 
navigational route known as the Indreleia. It is contended that 
since these waters have this character, certain consequences arise 
with regard to the determination of the territorial waters at the 
end of this water-way considered as a maritime strait. 
The Court is bound to observe that the Indreleia is not a strait 
at all, but rather a navigational route prepared as such by means 
of artificial aids to navigation provided by Norway. In these cir-
cumstances the Court is unable to accept the view that the 
Indreleia, for the purposes of the present case, has a status dif-
ferent from that of the other waters included in the ''skjaergaard". 
Thus the Court, confining itself for the moment to the .Con-
clusions of the United Kingdom, finds that the Norwegian Govern-
ment in fixing the base-lines for the delimitation of the Norwegian 
fisheries zone by the 1935 Decree has not violated international 
law. 
* * * 
It does not at all follow that, in the absence of rules having the 
technically precise character alleged by the United Kingdom Gov-
ernment, the delimitation undertaken by the Norwegian Govern-
ment in 1935 is not subject to certain principles which n1ake it 
possible to judge as to its validity u'nder international law. The 
delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it 
cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as 
expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of 
delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal 
State is competent to undertake it, the validity of the delimitation 
with regard to other States depends upon international law. 
In this connection, certain basic considerations inherent in the 
nature of the territorial sea, bring to light certain criteria which, 
though not entirely precise, can provide courts with an adequate 
basis for their decisions, which can be adapted to the diverse facts 
in question. 
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Among these considerations, some reference must be made to 
the close dependence of the territorial sea upon the land domain. 
It is the land which confers upon the coastal State a right to the 
waters off its coasts. It follows that while such a State must be 
allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to adapt its 
delimitation to practical needs and local requirements, the draw-
ing of base-lines must not depart to any appreciable extent from 
the general direction of the coast. 
Another fundamental consideration, of particular importance 
in this case, is the more or less close relationship existing between 
certain sea areas and the land formations which divide or sur-
round them. The real question raised in the choice of base-lines is 
in effect whether certain sea areas lying within these lines are 
sufficiently closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the · 
regime of internal waters. This idea, which is at the basis of the 
determination of the rules relating to bays, should be liberally 
applied in the case of a coast, the geographical configuration of 
which is as unusual as that of Norway. 
Finally, there is one consideration not to be overlooked, the 
scope of which extends beyond purely geographical factors: that 
of certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and 
importance of which are clearly evidenced by a long usage. 
Norway puts forward the 1935 Decree as the application of a 
traditional system of delimitation, a system which she claims to be 
in complete conformity with international law. The Norwegian 
Government has referred in this connection to an historic title, the 
meaning of which was made clear by Counsel for Norway at the 
sitting on October 12th, 1951 : "The Norwegian Government does 
not rely upon history to justify exceptional rights, to claim areas 
of sea which the general law would deny; it invokes history, 
together with other factors, to justify the way in which it applies 
the general law." This conception of an historic title is in co·n-
sonance with the Norwegian Government's understanding of the 
general rules of international law. In its view, these rules of inter-
national law take into account the diversity of facts ftnd, therefore, 
concede that the drawing of base-lines must be adapted to the 
special conditions obtaining in different regions. In its view, the 
system of delimitation applied in 1935, a system characterized by 
the use of straight lines, does not therefore infringe the general 
law; it is an adaptatio'n rendered necessary by local conditions. 
· The Court must ascertain precisely what this alleged system of 
delimitation consists of, what is its effect in law as against the 
United Kingdom, and whether it was applied by the 1935 Decree 
in a manner which conformed to international law. 
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It is common ground between the Parties that on the question 
of the existe·nce of a Norwegian system, the Royal Decree of 
February 22nd, 1812, is of cardinal importance. This Decree is 
in the following terms: "We vvish to lay down as a rule that, in 
all cases when there is a question of determining the limit of our 
territorial sovereignty at sea, that limit shall be reckoned at the 
distance of one ordinary sea league from the island or islet farthest 
from the mainland, not covered by the sea; of which all proper_ 
authorities shall be informed by rescript." 
This text does not clearly indicate how the base-lines between 
the islands or islets farthest from the mainland were to be drawn. 
In particular, it does not say in express terms that the lines must 
take the form of straight lines drawn between these points. But 
it may be noted that it was in this way that the 1812 Decree was 
invariably construed in Norway in the course of the 19th and 20th 
centuries. 
The Decree of October 16th, 1869, relating to the delimitation 
of Sunnmore, and the Statement of Reasons for this Decree, are 
particularly revealing as to the traditional Norwegian conception 
and the Norwegian construction of the Decree of 1812. It was by 
reference to the 1812 Decree, and specifically relying upon "the 
conception" adopted by that Decree, that the Ministry of the 
Interior justified the drawing of a straight line 26 miles in length · 
between the two outermost points of the "skjaergaard''. The 
Decree of September 9th, 1889, relating to the delimitation of 
Romsdal and Nordmore, applied the same method, drawing four 
straight lines, respectively 14.7 miles, 7 miles, 23.6 miles and 11.6 
miles in length. 
The 1812 Decree was similarly construed by the Territorial 
Waters Boundary Commission (Report of February 29th, 1912, 
pp. 48-49), as it was in the Memorandum of January 3rd, 1929, 
sent by the Norwegian Government to the Secretary-General of 
the League of Nations, in which it was said: "The direction laid 
down by this Decree should be interpreted in the sense that the 
starting-point for calculating the breadth of the territorial waters 
should be a line drawn along the 'skjaergaard' between the furthest 
rocks and, where there is no 'skjaergaard' between the extreme 
points.'' The judgment delivered by the Norwegian Supreme 
Court in 1934 in the St. Just case, provided final authority for 
this interpretation. This conception accords with the geographical 
characteristics of the Norwegian coast and is not contrary to the 
principles of international law. 
It should, however, be pointed out that whereas the 1812 Decree 
designated as base-points "the island or islet farthest from the 
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mainland not covered by the sea,, Norwegian governmental prac-
tice subsequently interpreted this provision as meaning that the 
limit was to be reckoned from the outermost islands and islets 
"not continuously covered by the sea". 
The 1812 Decree, although quite general in its terms, had as 
its immediate object the fixing of the limit applicable for the 
purposes of maritime neutrality. However, as soon as the Nor-
wegian Government found itself impelled by circumstances to 
delimit its fisheries zone, it regarded that Decree as laying down 
principles to be applied for purposes other than neutrality. The 
Statements of Reasons of October 1st, 1869, December 20th, 1880, 
and May 24th, 1889, are conclusive on this point. They also show 
that the delimitation effected in 1869 and in 1889 constituted a 
reasoned application of a definite system applicable to the whole 
of the Norwegian coast line, and was not merely legislation of 
local interest called for by any special requirements. The following 
passage from the Statement of Reasons of the 1869 Decree may 
in particular be referred to: "My Ministry assumes that the 
general rule mentioned above [namely, the four-mile rule], which 
is recognized by international law for the determination of the 
extent of a country's territorial waters, must be applied here in 
such a way that the sea area inside a line drawn parallel to a 
straight line between the two outermost islands or rocks not 
covered by the sea, Svinoy to the south and Storholmen to the 
north, and one geographical league north-west of that straight line, 
should be considered Norwegian maritime territory." 
The 1869 Statement of Reasons brings out all the elements 
which go to make up what the Norwegian Government describes 
as its traditional system of delimitation: base-points provided by 
the islands or islets farthest from the mainland, the use of straight 
lines joining up these points, the lack of any maximum length for 
such lines. The judgment of the Norwegian Supreme Court in the 
St. Just case upheld this interpretation and added that the 1812 
Decree had never been understood or applied "in such a way as 
to make the boundary follow the sinuosities of the coast or to cause 
its position to be determined by means of circles drawn round the 
points of the 'Skj aergaard' or of the mainland furthest out to sea 
-a method which it would be very difficult to adopt or to enforce 
in practice, having regard to the special configuration of this 
coast." Finally, it is established that, according to the Norwegian 
system, the base-lines must follow the general direction of the 
coast, which is in conformity with international law. 
Equally significant in this connection is the correspondence 
which passed between Norway and France between 1869-1870. 
86 
On December 21st, 1869, only two months after the promulgation 
of the Decree of October 16th relating to the delimitation of 
Sunnmore, the French Government asked the Norwegian Govern-
ment for an explanation of this enactment. It did so basing itself 
upon "the principles of international law". In a second Note dated 
December 30th of the same year, it pointed out that the distance 
between the base-points was greater than 10 sea miles, and that the 
line joining up these points should have been a broken line follow_-
ing the configuration of the coast. In a Note of February 8th, 1870, 
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, also dealing with the question 
from the point of view of international law, replied as follows: 
"By the same Note of December 30th, Your Excellency 
drew my attention to the fixing of the fishery limit in the 
S unnmore Archipelago by a straight line instead of a 
broken line. According to the view held by your Govern-
ment, as the distance between the islets of Svinoy and 
Storholmen is more than 10 sea miles, the fishery limit 
between these two points should have been a broken line 
following the configuration of the coast line and nearer 
to it than the present limit. In spite of the adoption in 
some treaties of the quite arbitrary distance of 10 sea 
miles, this distance would not appear to me to have ac-
quired the force of an international law. Still less would 
it appear to have any foundation in reality: one bay, by 
reason of the varying formations of the coast and sea-
bed, may have an entirely different character from that 
of another bay of the same width. It seems to me rather 
that local co'nditions and considerations of what is prac-
ticable and equitable should be decisive in specific cases. 
The configuration of our coasts in no way resembles that 
of the coasts of other European countries, and that fact 
alone makes the adoption of any absolute rule of universal 
application impossible in this case. 
"I venture to claim that all these reasons militate in 
favour of the line laid down by the Decree of October 
16th. A broken line, conforming closely to the indenta-
tions of the coast line between Svinoy and Storholmen, 
would have resulted in a boundary so involved and so in-
distinct that it would have been impossible to exercise 
any supervision over it. . . ." 
Language of this kind can only be construed as the considered ' 
expression of a legal conception regarded by the Norwegian ·1 
Government as compatible with international law. And indeed, :
1 
~I 
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the Fre'nch Government did -not pursue the matter. In a Note of 
July 27th, 1870, it is said that, while maintaining its standpoint 
with regard to principle, it was prepared to accept the delimitation 
laid down by the Decree of October 16th, 1869, as resting upon "a 
practical study of the configuration of the coast line and of the 
conditions of the inhabitants." 
The Court, having thus established the existence and the con-
stituent elements of the Norwegian system of delimitation, further 
finds that this system was consistently applied by Norwegian 
authorities and that it encountered no opposition on the part of 
other States. 
The United Kingdom Government has however sought to show 
' that the Norwegian Government has not consistently followed the 
principles of delimitation which, it claims, form its system, and 
that it has admitted by implication that some other method would 
be necessary to comply with international law. The documents to 
which the Agent of the Government of the United Kingdom prin-
cipally referred at the hearing on October 20th, 1951, relate to 
the period between 1906 and 1908, the period in which British 
trawlers made their first appearance off the Norwegian coast, and 
which, therefore, merits particular attention. 
The United Kingdom Government pointed out that the law of 
June 2nd, 1906, which prohibited fishing by foreigners, merely 
forbade fishing in "Norwegian territorial waters", and it deduced 
from the very general character of this reference that no definite 
system existed. The Court is unable to accept this interpretation, 
as the object of the law was to renew the prohibition against 
fishing and not to undertake a precise delimitation of the territorial 
sea. 
The second document relied upon by the United Kingdom 
Government is a letter dated March 24th, 1908, from the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs to the Minister of National Defence. The 
United Kingdom Government thought that this letter indicated 
an adherence by Norway to the low-water mark rule contrary to 
the present Norwegian position. This interpretation cannot be 
accepted; it rests .upon a confusion between the low-water mark 
rule as understood by the United Kingdom, which requires that 
all the sinuosities of the coast line at low tide should be followed, 
and the general practice of selecting the low-tide mark rather than 
that of the high tide for measuring the extent of the territorial 
sea. 
The third document referred to is a Note, dated November 11th, 
1908, from the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the 
French Charge d'Affaires at Christiania, in reply to a request for 
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information as to whether Norway had modified the limits of her 
territorial waters. In it the Minister said: "Interpreting Nor-
wegian regulations in this matter, whilst at the same time con-
forming to the general rule of the Law of Nations, this Ministry 
gave its opinion that the distance from the coast should be 
measured from the low-water mark and that every islet not con-
tinuously covered by the sea should be reckoned as a starting-
point." The United Kingdom Government argued that by the 
reference to "the general rule of the Law of Nations", instead o£ 
to its own system of delimitation entailing the use of straight lines, 
and, furthermore, by its statement that "every islet not con-
tinuously covered by the sea should be reckoned as a starting-
point", the Norwegian Government had completely departed from 
what it to-day describes as its system. 
It must be remembered that the request for information to 
which the Norwegian Government was replying related not to the 
use of straight lines, but to the breadth of Norwegian territorial 
waters. The point of the Norwegian Government's reply was that 
there had been no modification in the Norwegian legislation. More-
over, it is ilnpossible to rely upon a few words taken from a single 
note to draw the conclusion that the Norwegian Government had 
abandoned a position which its earlier official documents had 
clearly indicated. 
The Court considers that too much importance need not be 
attached to the few uncertainties or contradictions, real or ap-
parent, which the United Kingdom Government claims to have 
discovered in Norwegian practice. They may be easily understood 
in the light of the variety of the facts and conditions prevailing 
in the long period which has elapsed since 1812, and are not such 
as to modify the conclusions reached by the Court. 
In the light of these considerations, and in the absence of con-
vincing evidence to the contrary, the Court is bound to hold that , 
the Norwegian authorities applied their system of delimitation 
consistently and uninterruptedly from 1869 until the time when 
the dispute arose. 
From the standpoint of international law, it is now necessary 
to consider whether the application of the Norwegian system en-
countered any opposition from foreign States. 
Norway has been in a position to argue without any contradic-
tion that neither the promulgation of her delimitation Decrees in 
1869 and in 1889, nor their application, gave rise to any opposi-
tion on the part of foreign States. Since, moreover, these Decrees 
constitute, as has been shown above, the application of a well-
defined and uniform system, it is indeed this system itself which 
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would reap the benefit of general toleration, the basis of an his-
torical consolidation which would make it enforceable as against 
all States. 
The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the 
Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact. For a period of more 
than sixty years the United Kingdom Government itself in no way 
contested it. One cannot indeed consider as raising objections the 
discussions to vvhich the Lord Roberts incident gave rise in 1911, 
for the controversy which arose in this connection related to two 
questions, that of the four-mile limit, and that of Norwegian sov-
ereignty over the Varangerfj ord, both of which were unconnected 
with the position of base-lines. It would appear that it was only 
in its Memorandum of July 27th, 1933, that the United Kingdom 
made a formal and definite protest on this point. 
The United Kingdom Government has argued that the Nor-
wegian system of delimitation was not known to it and that the 
system therefore lacked the notoriety essential to provide the 
basis of an historic title enforceable against it. The Court is un-
able to accept this view. As a coastal State on the North Sea, 
greatly interested in the fisheries in this area, as a maritime Power 
traditionally concerned with the law of the sea and concerned 
particularly to defend the freedom of the seas, the United Kingdom 
could not have been ignorant of the Decree of 1869 which had at 
once provoked a request for explanations by the French Govern-
ment. Nor, knowing of it, could it have been under any mis-
apprehension as to the significance of its terms, which clearly 
described it as constituting the application of a system. The same 
observation applies a fortiori to the Decree of 1889 relating to the 
delimitation of Romsdal and Nordmore which must have appeared 
to the United Kingdom as a reiterated manifestation of the Nor-
wegian practice. 
Norway's attitude with regard to the North Sea Fisheries 
(Police) Convention of 1882 is a further fact which must at once 
have attracted the attention of Great Britain. There is scarcely 
any fisheries convention of greater importance to the coastal 
States of the North Sea or of greater interest to Great Britain. 
Norway's refusal to adhere to this Convention clearly raised the 
question of the delimitation of her maritime domain, especially 
with regard to bays, the question of their delimitation by means 
of straight lines of which Norway challenged the maximum length 
adopted in the Convention. Having regard to the fact that a few 
years before, the delimitation of Sunnmore by the 1869 Decree 
had been presented as an application of the Norwegian system, 
one cannot avoid the conclusion that, from that time on, all the 
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elements of the problem of Norwegian coastal waters had been 
clearly stated. The steps subsequently taken by Great Britain to 
secure Norway's adherence to the Convention clearly show that 
she was aware of and interested in the question. 
The Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only 
be strengthened with the passage of time, the United Kingdom 
Government refrained from formulating reservations. 
The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the inter~ 
national community, Great Britain's position in the North Sea, 
her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention 
would in any case warrant Norway's enforcement of her system 
against the United Kingdom. 
The Court is thus led to conclude that the method of straight 
lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the 
peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the 
dispute arose, this method had been consolidated by a constant 
and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of 
gover·nments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider 
it to be contrary to international law. 
* * * 
The question now arises whether the Decree of July 12th, 1935, 
which in its preamble is expressed to be an application of this , 
method, conforms to it in its drawing of the baselines, or whether, · 
at certain points, it departs from this method to any considerable 
extent. 
The schedule appended to the Decree of July 12th, 1935, in-
dicates the fixed points between which the straight base-lines are 
drawn. The Court notes that these lines were the result of a 
careful study initiated by the Norwegian authorities as far back 
as 1911. The base-lines recommended by the Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee of the Starting for the delimitation of the fisheries zone 
and adopted and made public for the first time by the Decree of , 
July 12th, 1935, are the same as those which the so-called 
Territorial Waters Boundary Commissions, successively appointed 
on June 29th, 1911, and July 12th, 1912, had drawn in 1912 for 
Finnmark and in 1913 for Nordland and Troms. The Court 
further notes that the 1911 and 1912 Commissions advocated 
these lines and in so doing constantly referred, as the 1935 Decree ; 
itself did, to the traditional system of delimitation adopted by , 
earlier acts and more particularly by the Decrees of 1812, 1869 
and 1889. 
In the absence of convincing evidence to the contrary, the Court i 
cannot readily find that the lines adopted in these circumstances 
by the 1935 Decree are not in accordance with the traditional ·I 
·I 
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Norwegian system. However, a purely factual difference arose 
between the Parties co'ncerning the three following base-points: 
. No. 21 (Vesterfallet i Gaasan), No. 27 (Tokkebaaen) and No. 39 
(Nordboen). This difference is now devoid of object. A telegram 
dated October 19th, 1951, from the Hydrographic Service of 
Norway to the Agent of the Norwegian Government, which was 
communicated to the Agent of the United Kingdom Government, 
has confirmed that these three points are rocks which are not 
, continuously submerged. Since this assertion has not been further 
disputed by the United Kingdom Government, it may be considered 
that the use of these rocks as base-points is in conformity with 
the traditional Norwegian system. 
Finally, it has been contended by the United Kingdom Govern-
n1ent that certain, at least, of the base-lines adopted by the Decree 
are, irrespective of whether or not they conform to the Norwegian 
system, contrary to the principles stated above by the Court as 
governing any delimitation of the territorial sea. The Court will 
consider whether, from the point of view of these principles, cer-
tain of the base-lines which have been criticized in some detail 
really are without justification. 
The Norwegian Government admits that the base-lines must be 
drawn in such a way as to respect the general direction of the 
coast and that they must be drawn in a reasonable manner. The 
United Kingdom Government contends that certain lines do not 
follow the general direction of the coast, or do not follow it suf-
ficie'ntly closely, or that they do not respect the natural connection 
existing between certain sea areas and the land formations sepa-
rating or surrounding them. For these reasons, it is alleged that 
the line drawn is contrary to the principles which govern the 
delin1itation of the maritime domain. 
The Court observes that these complaints, which assumed a very 
general scope in the written proceedings, have subsequently been 
reduced. 
The United Kingdom Government has directed its criticism more 
particularly against two sectors, the delimitation of which they 
I 
represented as extreme cases of deviation from the general di-
rection of the coast: the sector of Svaerholthavet (between base-
points 11 and 12) and that of Lopphavet (between base-points 
20 and 21). The Court will deal with the delimitation of these two 
sectors from this point of view . 
. The base-line between points 11 and 12, which is 38.6 sea miles 
in length, delimits the waters of the Svaerholt lying between Cape 
Nordkyn and the North Cape. The United Kingdom Government 
denies that the basin .so delimited has the character of a bay. Its 
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argument is founded on a geographical consideration. In its 
opinion, the calculation of the basin's penetration inland must 
stop at the tip of the Svaerholt peninsula (Svaerholtklubben). The 
penetration inland thus obtained being only 11.5 sea miles, as 
against 38.6 miles of breadth at the entrance, it is alleged that 
the basin in question does not have the character of a bay. The 
Court is unable to share this view. It considers that the basin in 
question must be contemplated in the light of all the geographical 
factors involved. The fact that a peninsula juts out and forms-
two wide fjords, the Laksefj ord and the Porsangerfj ord, cannot 
deprive the basin of the character of a bay. It is the distances 
between the disputed base-line and the most inland point of these 
fjords, 50 and 75 sea miles respectively, which must be taken into 
account in appreciating the proportion betwee'n the penetration 
inland and the width at the mouth. The Court concludes that 
Svaerholthavet has the character of a bay. 
The delimitation of the Lopphavet basin has also been criticized 
by the United Kingdom. As has been pointed out above, its 
criticism of the selection of base point No. 21 may be regarded 
as abandoned. The Lopphavet basin constitutes an ill-d.efined 
geographic whole. It cannot be regarded as having the character 
of a bay. It is made up of an extensive area of water dotted with 
large islands which are separated by inlets that terminate in the 
various fjords. The base-line has been challenged on the ground 
that it does not respect the general direction of the coast. It should 
be observed that, however justified the rule in question may be, it 
is devoid of any mathematical precision. In order properly to 
apply the rule, regard must be had for the relation between the 
deviation complained of and what, according to the terms of the 
rule, must be regarded as the general direction of the coast. There-
fore, one cannot confine oneself to examining one sector of the 
coast alone, except in a case of manifest abuse; nor can one rely 
on the impression that may be gathered from a large scale chart 
of this sector alone. In the case in point, the divergence between 
the base-line and the land formations is not such that it is a dis-
tortion of the general direction of the Norwegian coast. 
Even if it were considered that in the sector under review the 
deviation was too pronounced, it must be pointed out that the Nor-
wegian Government has relied upon an historic title clearly refer-
able to the waters of Lopphavet, namely, the exclusive privilege 
to fish and hunt whales granted at the end of the 17th century to 
Lt.-Commander Erich Lorch under a number of licenses which 
show, inter alia, that the water situated in the vicinity of the 
sunken rock of Gjesbaaen or Gjesboene and the fishing grounds , 
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pertaining thereto were regarded as falling exclusively within 
Norwegian sovereignty. But it may be observed that the fishing 
grounds here referred to are made up of two banks, one of which, 
the Indre Gjesboene, is situated between the base-line and the 
limit reserved for fishing, whereas the other, the Ytre Gjesboene, 
is situated further to seaward and beyond the fishing limit laid 
down in the 1935 Decree. 
These ancient concessions tend to confirm the Norwegian Gov-
ernme·nt's contention that the fisheries zone reserved before 1812 
was in fact much more extensive than the one delimited in 1935. 
It is suggested that it included all fishing banks from which land 
was visible, the range of vision being, as is recognized by the 
United Kingdom Government, the principle of delimitation in 
force at that time. The Court considers that, although it is not 
always clear to what specific areas they apply, the historical data 
produced in support of this contention by the Norwegian Govern-
ment lend some weight to the idea of the survival of traditional 
rights reserved to the inhabitants of the Kingdom over fishing 
grounds included in the 1935 delimitation, particularly in the case 
of Lopphavet. Such rights, founded on the vital needs of the 
population and attested by very ancient and peaceful usage, may 
legitimately be taken into account in drawing a line which, more-
over, appears to the Court to have been kept within the bounds 
of what is moderate and reasonable. 
As to the V estfj ord, after the oral argument, its delimitation 
no longer presents the importance it had in the early stages of the 
proceedings. Since the Court has found that the waters of the 
Indreleia are internal waters, the waters of the Vestfjord, as 
indeed the waters of all other Norwegian fjords, can only be 
regarded as internal waters. In these circumstances, whatever 
difference may still exist between the views of the United Kingdom 
Government and those of the Norwegian Government on this 
point, is negligible. It is reduced to the question whether the base-
line should be drawn between points 45 and 46 as fixed by the 1935 
Decree, or whether the line should terminate at the Kalsholmen 
lighthouse on Tenholmerne. The Court considers that this ques-
tion is purely local in character and of secondary importance, and 
that its settlement should be left to the coastal State._ 
For these reasons, 
THE COURT, 
rejecting all submissions to the contrary, 
Finds 
by ten votes to two, 
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that the method employed for the delimitation of the fisheries 
zone by the Royal Norwegian Decree of July 12th 1935, is not 
contrary to international law; and 
by eight votes to four, 
that the base-lines fixed by the said Decree in application of 
this method are not contrary to internatio'nal law. 
Done in French and English, the French text being authorita-
tive, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this eighteenth day of 
December, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-one, in three -
copies, one of which will be placed in the archives of the Court 
and the others transmitted to the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway, respectively. 
(Signed) BASDEV ANT, 
President. 
(Signed) E. HAMBRO, 
Registrar. 
Judge HACKWORTH declares that he concurs in the operative 
part of the Judgment but desires to emphasize that he does so for 
the reason that he considers that the Norwegian Government has 
proved the existence of an historic title to the disputed areas of 
water. 
Judges ALVAREZ and HSU MO, availing themselves of the 
right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append to the 
Judgment of the Court statements of their separate opinions. 
Judges Sir Arnold McNAIR and READ, availing themselves of 
the right conferred on them by Article 57 of the Statute, append 
to the Judgment statements of their dissenting opinions. 
(Initialled) J.B. 
(Initialled) E.H. 
4. Individual Opinion of Judge Alvarez 
[Translation.] 
I 
The United Kingdom has filed with the International Court of 
Justice an Application in which it challenges the validity of the 
Norwegian Decree of July 12th, 1935, which delimited the Nor-
wegian fishery zones off a part of the Norwegian coast. It considers 
that the delimitation so effected is contrary to the precepts of inter-
national law and asks the Court to state the principles of inter-
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national law applicable for defining the base-lines by reference to 
which the Norwegian Government is entitled to delimit its fisheries 
zones. 
In the course of the oral proceedings, the United Kingdom 
Government submitted certain new conclusions, particularly on 
questions of law, and asked the Court to adjudicate upon these also. 
In her Counter-Memorial and Rejoinder, and in her arguments 
in Court, Norway contended that the delimitation of these fisheries 
zones established in the 1935 Decree was not in conflict with the 
precepts of international law and that it corresponded, in any 
event, to historic rights long possessed by her and which she 
indicated. 
The present litigation is of great importance, not only to the 
Parties to the case, but also to all other States. 
At the beginning of his address to the Court, the Attorney-
General said: "It is common ground that this case is not only a 
very important one to the United Kingdom and to Norway, but 
that the decision of the Court on it will be of the very greatest 
importance to the world generally as a precedent, since the Court's 
decision in this case must contain important pronouncements con-
cerning the rules of international law relating to coastal waters. 
The fact that so many governments have asked for copies of our 
Pleadings in this case is evidence that this is the general view." 
II 
In considering the present case, I propose to follow a method 
different from that which is customarily adopted, particularly with 
regard to the law. It consists of bringing to light and retaining the 
principal facts, then of considering the points of law dominating 
the whole case and, finally, those which relate to each important 
question. 
The application of this method may, at first sight, appear to be 
somewhat academic; but it is essentially practical, since it has as 
its object the furnishing of direct answers to be given on the 
questions submitted to the Court. 
Moreover, this method is called for by reason of the double task 
which the Court now has: the resolution of cases submitted to it 
and the development of the law of nations. 
It is commonly stated that the present Court is a continuation of 
the former Court and that consequently it must follow the methods 
~nd the jurisprudence of that Court. This is only partly true, for 
in the interval which elapsed between the operations of the Courts, 
a World War occurred which involved rapid and profound changes 
in international life and greatly affected the law of nations. 
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These changes have underlined the importance of the Court's 
second function. For it now happens with greater frequency than 
formerly that, on a given topic, no applicable precepts are to be 
found, or that those which do exist present lacunae or appear to be 
obsolete, that is to say, they no longer correspond to the new condi-
tions of the life of peoples. In all such cases, the Court must de-
velop the law of nations, that is to say, it must remedy its short-
comings, adapt existing principles to these new conditions and, 
even if no principles exist, create principles in conformity with -
such conditions. The Court has already very successfully under-
taken the creation of law in a case which will remain famous in 
the annals of international law (Advisory Opinion of April 11th, 
1949, on "Reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the 
United Nations"). The Court, in this case, can effectively dis-
charge the same task. 
The adaptation of the law of nations to the new conditions of 
international life, which is to-day necessary, is something quite 
different from the "Restatement" advocated by Anglo-Saxon 
jurists as a means of ending ~he crisis in international law, which 
consists merely of stating the law as it has been established and 
applied up to the present, without being too much concerned with 
any changes that it may recently have undergone or which it may 
undergo in the future. 
III 
I shall not dwell on a detailed examination of the facts alleged 
by the Parties nor upon the evidence submitted by the Parties in 
support of their contentions, because the Judgment of the Court , 
deals with them at length. In the following pages I shall concen-
trate only on the questions of law raised by the present case. 
For centuries, because of the vastness of the sea and the limited 
relations between States, the use of the sea was subject to no 
rules; every State could use it as it pleased. 
From the end of the 18th century, publicists proclahned, and the 
law of nations recognized as necessary for States, the exercise of 1 
sovereign powers by States over an area of the sea bordering their .
1 shores. The extent of this sea area, which was known as the terri- I 
torial sea, was first fixed at the range of the contemporary cannon, I 
and later at 3 sea miles. The question indeed was one for the ~ 
domestic law of each country. Several of the countries of Latin • 
America incorporated provisions relating to this question in their 
civil codes. 
As the result of the growing importance of the question of the ' 
territorial sea, a World Conference was convened at The Hague .] 
:1 
97 
in 1930 for the purpose of _providing rules governing certain of 
its aspects and to deal with two other matters. This Conference, 
in which such great hopes had been reposed, did not establish any 
precept relating to the territorial sea. It made it clear that no well-
defined rules existed on this subject, that there were merely anum-
ber of conventions between certain States, certain trends and cer-
tain usages and practices. 
It was contended at the hearings that a great number of States 
at this Conference had accepted the extent of the territorial sea as 
being fixed at three sea miles, and had also accepted as established 
the means of reckoning this breadth; and this assertion was chal-
lenged. It is unnecessary to dwell long on this point for, in fact, 
the Conference, as has been said, did not adopt any provision on the 
question. Moreover, the conditions of international life have con-
siderably changed since that time; it is therefore probable that the 
States which in 1930 accepted a breadth of three sea miles would 
not accept it to-day. 
IV 
What should be the position adopted by the Court, in these cir-
cumstances, to resolve the present dispute? 
The Parties, in their Pleadings and in their Oral Arguments, 
have advanced a number of theories, as well as systems, practices 
and, indeed, rules which they regarded as constituting interna-
tional law. The Court thought that it was necessary to take them 
into consideration. These arguments, in my opinion, marked the 
beginning of a serious distortion of the case. 
In accordance with uniformly accepted doctrine, international 
judicial tribunals must, in the absence of principles provided by 
conventions, or of customary principles on a given question, apply 
the general principles of law. This doctrine is expressly confirmed 
in Article 38 of the Statute of the Court. 
It should be observed in this connection that international 
arbitration is now entering a new phase. It is not enough to stress 
the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; re-
gard must also be had, as I have said, to the modifications which 
these principles may have undergone as a result of the great 
changes which have occurred in international life, and the prin-
ciples must be adapted to the new conditions of international life; 
indeed, if no principles exist covering a given question, principles 
_must be created to conform to those conditions. 
The taking into consideration of these general principles, and 
their adaptation, are all the more necessary in the present case, 
-since the United Kingdom has asked the Court to declare that 
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the Norwegian Decree of 1935 Is contrary to the principles of 
international law now in force. 
v 
What are the principles of international law which the Court 
must have recourse to and, if necessary, adapt? And what are the 
principles which it must in reality create? 
It should, in the first place, be observed that frequent refer-
ence is made to the principles of the law of nations, in conven-
tions and in certain of the Judgments of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice, but it is not said \Vhat those principles· are 
nor where they may be found. 
Some clarification is therefore necessary on this point. 
In the first place, many of the principles, particularly the great 
principles, have their origin in the legal conscience of peoples (the 
psychological factor) . This conscience results from social and 
international life; the requirements of this social and international 
life naturally give rise to certain norms considered necessary to 
govern the conduct of States inter se. 
As a result of the present dynamic character of the life of peo-
ples, the principles of the law of nations are continually being 
created, and they undergo more or less rapid modification as a 
result of the great changes occurring in that life. 
For the principles of law resulting from the juridical con-
science of peoples to have any value, they must have a tangible 
manifestation, that is to say, they must be expressed by authorized 
bodies. 
Up to the present, this juridical conscience of peoples has been 
reflected in conventions, customs and the opinions of qualified 
jurists. 
But profound changes have occurred in this connection. Con-
ventions continue to be a very important form for the expression 
of the juridical conscience of peoples, but they generally lay down 
only new principles, as was the case with the Convention on 
genocide. On the other hand, customs tend to disappear as the 
result of the rapid changes of modern international life; and a 
new case strongly stated may be sufficient to render obsolete an 
ancient custom. Customary law, to which such frequent reference 
is made in the course of the arguments, should therefore be ac-
cepted only with prudence. 
The further means by which the juridical conscience of peoples 
may be expressed at the present time are the resolutions of diplo-
matic assemblies, particularly those of the United Nations and 
especially the decisions of the International Court of Justice. Ref-
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erence must also be made to the recent legislation of certain coun-
tries, the resolutions of the great associations devoted to the study 
of the law of nations, the works of the Codification Commission 
set up by the United Nations, and finally, the opinions of qualified 
jurists. 
These are the new elements on which the new international 
law, still in the process of formation, will be founded. This law 
-vvill, consequently, have a character entirely different from that of 
traditional or classical international law, which has prevailed to 
the present time. 
VI 
Let us now consider the elements by means of which the general 
principles brought to light are to be adapted to the existing con-
ditions of international life and by means of which new prin-
ciples are, if necessary, to be created. 
The starting point is the fact that, for the traditional individual-
istic regime on which social life has hitherto been founded, there 
is being substituted more and more a new regime, a regime of 
interdependence, and that, consequently, the law of social inter-
dependence is taking the place of the old individualistic law. 
The characteristics of this law, so far as international law is 
concerned, may be stated as follows : 
(a) This law governs not merely a community of States, but 
an organized international society. 
(b) It is not exclusively juridical; it has also aspects which 
are political, economic, social, psychological, etc. It follows that 
the traditional distinction between legal and political questions, 
and between the domain of law and the domain of politics is con-
siderably modified at the present time. 
(c) It is concerned not only with the delimitation of the 
rights of States but also with harmonizing them. 
case. 
(d) It particularly takes into account the general interest. 
(e) It also takes into account all possible aspects of every 
(f) It lays down, besides rights, obligations towards inter-
national society; and sometimes States are entitled to exercise 
certain rights only if they have complied with th-e correlative 
duties. (Title V of the "Declaration of the Great Principles of 
Modern International Law" approved by three great associations 
devoted to the study of the law of nations.) 
(g) It condemns abus de droit. 
(h) It adapts itself to the needs of international life and 
develops side by side with it. 
i()() 
What are the principles which, in accordance with the fore-
going, the Court must bring to light, adapt if necessary, or even 
create, with regard to the maritime domain and, in particular, the 
territorial sea? 
They may be stated as follows : 
1. Having regard to the great variety of the geographical 
and economic conditions of States, it is not possible to lay down 
uniform rules, applicable to all, governing the extent of the terri- -
torial sea and the \Vay in which it is to be reckoned. 
2. Each State may therefore determine the extent of its ter-
ritorial sea and the way in which it is to be reckoned, provided it 
does so in a reasonable manner, and that it is capable of exercising 
supervision over the zone in question and of carrying out the 
duties imposed by international law, that it does not infringe 
rights acquired by other States, that it does no harm to general 
interests and does not constitute an abus de droit. 
In fixing the breadth of its territorial sea, the State must indi-
cate the reasons, geographic, economic, etc., which provide the 
justification therefor. 
In the light of this principle, it is no longer necessary to debate 
questions of base-lines, straight lines, closing lines of ten sea miles 
for bays, etc., as has been done in this case. 
Similarly, if a State adopts too great a breadth for its terri-
torial sea, having regard to its land territory and to the needs of 
its population, or if the base-lines which it indicates appear to be 
arbitrarily selected, that will constitute an abus de droit. 
3. States have certain rights over their territorial sea, particu-
larly rights to the fisheries; but they also have certain duties, 
particularly those of exercising supervision off their coasts, of 
facilitating navigation by the construction of lighthouses, by the 
dredging of certain areas of sea, etc. 
4. States may alter the extent of the territorial sea which they 
have fixed, provided that they furnish adequate grounds to justify 
the change. 
5. States may fix a greater or lesser area beyond their terri-
torial sea over which they may reserve for themselves certain 
rights: customs, police rights, etc. 
6. The rights indicated above are of great weight if established I 
by a group of States, and especially by all the States of a continent. ~ .• ! 
The countries of Latin America have, individually or collectively, 
reserved wide areas of their coastal waters for specific purposes: 
the maintenance of neutrality, customs' services, etc., and lastly, 
for the exploitation of the \vealth of the continental shelf. 
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7. Any State directly concerned may raise an objection to an-
other State's decision as to the extent of its territorial sea or of 
the area beyond it, if it alleges that the conditions set out above 
for the determination of these areas have been violated. Disputes 
arising out of such objections must be resolved in accordance with 
the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. 
8. Similarly, for the great bays and straits, there can be no 
uniform rules. The international status of every great bay and 
strait 1nust be determined by the coastal States directly concerned, 
having regard to the general interest. The position here must be 
the same as in the case of the great international rivers: each 
case must be subject to its own special rules. 
At the Conference held in Barcelona in 1921 on navigable water-
ways, I maintained that it was impossible to lay down general and 
uniform rules for all international rivers, in view of the great 
variety of conditions of all sorts obtaining among them; and this 
point of view was accepted. 
In short, in the case of maritime and river routes, it is not 
possible to contemplate the laying dovvn of uniform rules; the rules 
must accord with the realities of international life. In place of 
uniformity of rules it is necessary to have variety; but the general 
interest must always be taken into account. 
9. A principle which must receive special consideration is that 
relating to prescription. This principle, under the name of his-
toric rights, was discussed at length in the course of the hearings. 
The concept of prescription in international law is quite differ-
ent from that which it has in domestic law. As a result of the 
important part played by force in the formation of States, there 
is no prescription with regard to their territorial status. The polit-
ical map of Europe underwent numerous changes in the course of 
the 19th and 20th centuries; it is to-day very different from what 
it was before the Great War, without any application of the prin-
ciple of prescription. 
Nevertheless, in some instances, prescription plays a part in 
international law and it has certain important features. It is 
recognized, in particular, in the case of the acquisition and the 
exercise of certain rights. 
In support of the effect of prescription in such cases, two very 
. important learned works should be mentioned, which adopt the 
collective opinion of jurists. 
The first of these is the "Declaration of the Great Principles of 
·Modern International Law'' which provides, in Article 20 : "No 
io2 
State is entitled to oppose, in its own interests, the making of 
rules on a question of general interest." 
"When, however, it has exercised special rights for a consider-
able time, account must be taken of this in the making of rules." 
The other learned work is the "Draft Rules for the Territorial 
Sea in Peacetime" adopted by the Institute of International Law at 
the 1928 Session in Stockholm. Article 2 of this draft provides: 
"The breadth of the territorial sea is 3 sea miles. (It 
was then thought that this was sufficient.) 
International usage may justify the recognition of a 
breadth greater or less than 3 miles." 
For prescription to have effect, it is necessary that the rights 
claimed to be based thereon should be well established, that they 
should have been uninterruptedly enjoyed and that they should 
comply with the conditions set out in 2 above. · 
International law does not lay down any specific duration of 
time necessary for prescription to have effect. A comparatively · 
recent usage relating to the territorial sea may be of greater effect 
than an ancient usage insufficiently proved. 
10. It is also necessary to pay special attention to another 
principle which has been much spoken of: the right of States to 
do everything which is not expressly forbidden by international · 
law. This principle, formerly correct, in the days of absolute 
sovereignty, is no longer so at the present day: the sovereignty of 
States is henceforth limited not only by the rights of other States 
but also by other factors previously indicated, which make up 
what is called the new international law: the Charter of the United 
Nations, resolutions passed by the Assembly of the United Na-
tions, the duties of States, the general interests of international 
society and lastly the prohibition of abus de droit. 
11. Any State alleging a principle of international law must 
prove its existence; and one claiming that a principle of inter-
national law has been abrogated or has become ineffective and 
requires to be renewed, must likewise provide proof of this claim. 
12. Agreement between the Parties as to the existence of a 
principle of law, or as to its application, for instance, as to the way 
in which base-lines determining the extent of the territorial sea 
are to be selected, etc., cannot have any influence upon the de-
cision of the Court on the question. 
13. International law takes precedence over municipal law. 
Acts committed by a State which violate international law involve ' 
the responsibility of that State. 
14. A State is not obliged to protest against a violation of . 
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international law, unless it is aware or ought to be aware of this 
violation; but only the State directly concerned is entitled to refer 
the matter to the appropriate international body. (Article 39 of 
the "Declaration of the Great Principles of Modern International 
Law".) 
VII 
In accordance with the considerations set out above, I come to 
the following conclusions upon the questions submitted to the 
Court: 
(1) Norway-like all other States-is entitled, in accordance 
with the general principles of the law of nations now in existence, 
to determine not only the breadth of her territorial sea, but also 
the manner in which it is to be reckoned. 
(2) The Norwegian Decree of 1935, which delimited the Nor-
wegian territorial sea, is not contrary to any express provisions of 
international law. Nor is it contrary to the general principles of 
international law, because the delimitation is reasonable, it does 
not infringe rights acquired by other States, it does no harm 
to general interests and does not constitute an abus de droit. 
In enacting the Decree of 1935, Norway had in view simply 
the needs of the population of the areas in question. 
(3) In view of the foregoing, it is unnecessary to consider 
whether or not Norway acquired by prescription a right to lay 
down a breadth of more than three sea miles for her territorial 
sea and the way in which its base-lines should be selected. 
( 4) If Norway is entitled to fix the extent of her territorial 
sea, as has been said, it is clear that she can prohibit other States 
from fishing within the limits of that sea without their being 
entitled to complain of a violation of their rights. 
(5) The answer to the contentions of the Parties with regard to 
the existence of certain precepts of the law of nations which they 
consider to be in force at the present time has been given in the 
preceding pages. 
(Signed) ·A. ALVAREZ. 
5. Separate Opinion of Judge Hsu Mo 
I agree with the finding of the Court that the method of straight 
lines used in the Norwegian Royal Decree of July 12th, 1935, for 
the delimitation of the fisheries zone, is not contrary to inter-
national law. But I regret that I am unable to share the view of 
the Court that all the straight base-lines fixed by that Decree 
are in conformity with the principles of international law. 
It is necessary to emphasize the fact that Norway's method 
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of delimiting the belt of her northern territorial sea by draw-
ing straight lines between point and point, island and island, 
constitutes a deviation from what I believe to be a general rule 
of international law, namely, that apart from cases of bays and 
islands, the belt of territorial sea should be measured, in prin-
ciple, from the line of the coast at low tide. International law per-
mits, in certain circumstances, deviations from this general rule. 
Where the deviations are justifiable, they must be recognized by_ 
other States. Norway is justified in using the method of straight 
lines because of her special geographical conditions and her con-
sistent past practice which is acquiesced in by the international 
communty as a whole. But for such physical and historical facts, 
the method employed by Norway in her Decree of 1935 would have 
to be considered to be contrary to international law. In examining, 
therefore, the question of the validity or non-validity of the base-
lines actually drawn by Norway, it must be borne in mind that it 
is not so much the direct application of the general rule as the 
degree of deviation from the general rule that is to be considered. 
The question in each case is: how far the line deviates from the 
configuration of the coast and whether such deviation, under the 
system which the Court has correctly found Norway to have 
established, should be recognized as being necessary and rea-
sonable. 
The exarnination of each base-line cannot thus be undertaken in 
total disregard of the coast line. In whatever way the belt of 
territorial sea may be determined, it always remains true that 
the territorial sea owes its existence to land and cannot be com-
pletely detached from it. Norway herself recognizes that the base-
lines must be drawn in a reasonable manner and must conform to 
the general direction of the coast. 
The expression "to conform to the general direction of the 
coast", being one of Norway's own adoption and constituting one 
of the elements of a system established by herself, should not be 
given a too liberal interpretation, so liberal that the coast line is 
almost completely ignored. It cannot be interpreted to mean that I 
Norway is at liberty to draw straight lines in any way she pleases 
provided they do not amount to a deliberate distortion of the j 
general outline of the coast when viewed as a whole. It must be ~~ 
interpreted in the light of the local conditions in each sector with ;j 
the aid of a relatively large scale chart. If the words "to conform 
to the general direction of the coast" have any meaning in law at 
all, they must mean that the base-lines, straight as they are, 
should follow the configuration of the coast as far as possible and 
should not unnecessarily and unreasonably traverse great ex- , 
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panses o£ water, taking no account of iand or islands situated 
within them. 
Having examined the different sectors of the territorial sea 
as delimited by the Decree of 1935, I find two obvious cases in 
which the base-line cannot be considered to have been justifiably 
drawn. I refer to the base-line between points 11 and 12, which 
traverses Svaerholthavet, and the base-line between points 20 and 
21, which runs across Lopphavet. 
In the former case, the base-line, being 39 miles long, encloses 
a large area of the sea as Norwegian internal waters. The ques-
tion to be determined here is whether the line is to be considered 
as the closing line of a bay or whether it is simply a line joining 
one base-point to another. If it is the former, it will be necessary 
to determine whether the area in question constitutes a bay in 
international law. In my opinion, the area is a combination of bays, 
large and small, eight in all, but not a bay in itself. It is not a bay 
in itself simply because it does not have the shape of a bay. To 
treat a number of adjacent bays as an entity, thereby completely 
ignoring their respective closing lines, would result in the creation 
of an artificial and fictitious bay, which does not fulfil the require-
ments of a bay, either in the physical or in the legal sense. There 
is no rule of international law which permits the creation of such 
kind of bay. 
It has been argued by the Agent of the Norwegian Government 
that the fact that the Svaerholt peninsula protrudes into the 
waters in question to form the two fjords of Laksefjord and 
Porsangerfjord cannot deprive these waters of the character of a 
bay. But geographically and legally, it is precisely the existence of 
this peninsula that makes the two fjords separate and distinct 
bays, and it is this fact, coupled with the protrusion of smaller 
peninsulas on either side of the two fjords, that gives to this part 
of the coast (the section between points 11 and 12), not the char-
acter of a bay, but merely the character of a curvature, a large 
concavity formed by the closing lines of several independent 
bays. Nature having created a number of bays,· neighbouring 
but distinct from one another, the littoral State cannot, by the 
exercise of its sovereignty, turn them into one bay by drawing a 
long line between two most extreme points. 
If the base-line over Svaerholthavet is not the closing line of a 
qay, it must be just one of the straight lines joining one base-
point to another. In that case, I fail to see how that line can be 
considered to conform to the general direction of the coast. In order 
to follow the general configuration of the coast, it should take into 
account at least some of the points which serve as the starting or 
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terminal points of the closing lines of the bays now enclosed by 
the long line in question. To leave out all the points on land which 
interpose between the two extreme points Nos. 11 and 12 and to 
enclose the whole concavity by drawing one excessively long line 
is tantamount to using the straight line method to extend seaward 
the four-mile breadth of the territorial sea. The application of the 
method in this manner cannot, in my view, be considered as 
reasonable. 
In the case of Lopphavet, the line connecting points 20 and 21,-
being 44 miles in length, affects an area of water of several 
hundred square miles. Norway does not claim this expanse of 
water to be a bay, and, indeed, by no stretch of the imagination 
could it be considered as a bay. Since Lopphavet is not a bay, there 
does not exist any legal reason for the base-line to skip over two 
important islands, Loppa and Fugloy, each of which forms· a unit 
of the "skjaergaard". In ignoring these islands, the base-line 
makes an obviously excessive deviation from the general direction 
of the coast. For this reason, it cannot be regarded as being 
justifiable. 
The Agent of the Norwegian Government remarked during 
the oral proceedings that the basin of Lopphavet led to the In-
dreleia which should be considered as Norwegian internal waters. 
I do not think that the Indreleia has anything to do with the region 
in question. For the Indreleia, according to the charts furnished by 
the Norwegian Government, goes through the Kaagsund between 
the islands of Arnoy and Kaagen and proceeds northward and 
northeastward between the islands of Loppa and Loppakalven on 
the one hand and the mainland on the other, finally bending into 
the Soroysund. It does not at all cut through Lopphavet outside 
the islands of Arnoy, Loppa and Soroy. Consequently, it does not 
overlap any portion of the immense area in this sector enclosed 
by the long base-line as Norwegian internal waters. 
I have so far examined the question of the validity or otherwise 
of the two base-lines, the one affecting Svaerholthavet, the other 
Lopphavet, exclusively from the aspect of their conformity or non-
conformity with the general direction of the coast. It remains to 
consider whether Norway may base her claim in respect of the 
two regions on historical grounds. In my opinion, notwithstanding 
all the documents she has produced, she has not succeeded in 
establishing any historic title to the waters in question. 
In support of her historic title, Norway has relied on habitual 
fishing by the local people and prohibition of fishing by foreigners. 
As far as the fishing activities of the coastal inhabitants are con-
cerned, I need only point out that individuals, by undertaking , 
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enterprises on their own initiative, for their own benefit and with-
out any delegation of authority by their Government, cannot con-
fer sovereignty on the State, and this despite the passage of time 
and the absence of molestation by the people of other countries. 
As for prohibition by the Norwegian Government of fishing by 
foreigners, it is undoubtedly a kind of State action which militates 
in favour of Norway's claim of prescription. But the Rescripts on 
which she has relied contain one fatal defect: the lack of precision. 
For they fail to show any precise and well-defined areas of water, 
in which prohibition was intended to apply and was actually en-
forced. And precision is vital to any prescriptive claim to areas of 
water which might otherwise be high seas. 
With regard to the licenses for fishing granted on three 
occasions by the King of Denmark and Norway to Erich Lorch, 
Lieutenant-Commander in the Dana-Norwegian Navy towards 
the close of the 17th century, I do not think that this is sufficient 
to confer historic title on Norway to Lopphavet. In the first place, 
the granting by the Danish-Norwegian Sovereign to one of his 
own subjects of what was at the time believed to be a special 
privilege can hardly be considered as conclusive evidence of the 
acquisition of historic title to Lopphavet vis-a-vis all foreign 
States. In the second place, the concessions were limited to waters 
near certain rocks and did not cover the whole area of Lopphavet. 
Lastly, there is no evidence to show that the concessions were 
exploited to the exclusion of participation by all foreigners for a 
period sufficiently long to enable the N orvvegian Government to 
derive prescriptive rights to Lopphavet. 
My conclusion is therefore that neither by the test of conformity 
with the general direction of the coast, nor on historical grounds, 
can the two base-lines drawn across Svaerholthavet and Lop-
phavet, respectively, be considered as being justifiable under the 
principles of international law. 
(Signed) Hsu Mo. 
6. Dissenting Opinion of Sir Arnold McNair 
In this case the Court has to decide whether certain areas of 
water off the coast of Norway are high seas or Norwegian waters, 
either territorial or internal. If they are high seas, then foreign 
fisherman are authorized to fish there. If they are Norwegian 
waters, then foreign fishermen have no right to fish there except 
with the permission of Norway. I have every sympathy with the 
small inshore fisherman who feels that his livelihood is being 
threatened by more powerfully equipped competitors, especially 
when those competitors are foreigners; but the issues raised in 
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this case concern the line dividing Norwegian waters from the 
high seas, and those are issues which can only be decided on a basis 
of law. 
* * * 
The preamble and the executive parts of the Decree of 1935 are 
as follows: 
"On the basis of well-established national titles of 
right; 
by reason of the geographical conditions prevailing on 
the Norwegian coasts ; 
in safeguard of the vital interests of the inhabitants of 
the northernmost parts of the country; 
and in accordance with the Royal Decrees of the 22nd 
February, 1812, and 16th October, 1869, the 5th J anua.ry, 
1881, and the 9th September, 1889, 
are hereby established lines of delimitation towards the 
high sea of the Norwegian fisheries zone as regards that 
part of Norway which is situated northward of 66 o 28.8' 
North latitude. 
These lines of delimitation shall run parallel \vith 
straight base-lines drawn between fixed points on the 
mainland, on islands or rocks, starting from the final 
point of the boundary line of the Realm in the eastern-
most part of Varangerfjorden and going as far as Traena 
in the County of Nordland. 
The fixed points between which the base-lines shall be 
drawn are indicated in detail in a schedule annexed to 
this Decree." 
[Schedule] 
Mr. Arntzen, the Norwegian Agent and Counsel, told the Court 
(October 5th) that: 
"The Decree of 1935 is founded on the following 
principles: the Norwegian territorial zone is four sea-
miles in breadth. It is measured from straight lines which 
conform to the general direction of the coast and are 
drawn between the outermost islands, islets and reefs in 
such a way as never to lose sight of the land." 
AI though the Decree of 1935 does not use the expression "ter· il 
ritorial sea" or "waters" or "zone", it cannot be denied that the 
present dispute relates to the Norwegian territorial sea. The : 
·Judgment of the Court is emphatic on this point. The same point . 
emerges clearly from the United Kingdom's Application institut- . 
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ing the proceedings and was insisted upon in the Norwegian writ-
ten and oral argument on numerous occasions. Thus, on October 
9th, the Norwegian Counsel, Professor Bourquin, said: 
"What is the subject of the dispute? It relates to the 
base-lines-that is to say, to the lines from which the 
four miles of the Norwegian territorial sea are to be 
reckoned. . . ." 
And again, in his oral reply, he said on October 25th: 
"What [Norway] claims-apart from her historic 
title-is that the limits imposed by international law 
with regard to the delimitation of her maritime territory 
have not been infringed by the 1935 Decree and that this 
Decree can therefore be set up as against the United 
Kingdom without any necessity for any special acquies-
cence on the part of the United Kingdom." 
One thing this dispute clearly is not. It is not a question of the 
right of a maritime State to declare the existence of a contiguous 
zone beyond its territorial waters, in which zone it proposes to 
take measures for the conservation of stocks of fish. An illus-
tration of this is to be found in President Truman's "Proclama-
tion \vith respect to Coastal Fisheries in certain areas of the High 
Seas, dated September 28th, 1945" (American Journal of Inter-
national Law) Vol. 40, 1946, Official Documents, p. 46) ; it will 
suffice to quote the following statement: 
"·The character as high seas of the areas in \vhich such 
convervation zones are established and the right to their 
free and unimpeded navigation are in no way thus 
affected.'' 
That is not this case, for here the question is whether certain 
disputed areas of sea water are parts of the high seas or parts of 
the territorial or internal waters of the coastal State. 
In the course of the proceedings in the ca~e, the United 
Kingdom has made certain admissions or concessions which 
can be summarized as follows : 
(a) that for the purposes of this case Norway is entitled to a 
four-mile limit; 
(b) that the waters of the fjords and sunds (including the 
Varangerfjord and Vestfjord) which fall within the conception 
of a bay, are, subject to a minor point affecting the status of the 
Vestfjord which I do not propose to discuss, Norwegian internal 
\Vaters; and 
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(c) that (as defined in the Conclusions of the United Kingdom) 
the waters lying between the island fringe and the mainland are 
Norwegian waters, either territorial or internal. 
The Parties are also in conflict upon another minor point, 
namely, the status of the waters in certain portions of Indreleia, 
about which I do not propose to say anything. 
* * * 
I shall no\v summarize the relevant part of the law of terri-
torial waters as I understand it: 
(a) To every State whose land territory is at any place washed 
by the sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of 
maritime territory consisting of what the law calls territorial 
waters (and in some cases national waters in addition). Inter-
national law does not say to a State: "You are entitled to· claim 
territorial waters if you want them." No maritime State can re-
fuse them. International law imposes upon a maritime State cer-
tain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising out of 
the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The 
possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon 
the will of the State, but compulsory. 
(b) While the actual delimitation of the frontiers of terri-
torial waters lies within the competence of each State because 
each State knows its own coast best, yet the principles followed 
in carrying out this delimitation are within the domain of law 
and not within the discretion of each State. As the Supreme Court 
of the United States said in 1946 in the United States v. State of 
California, 332 U.S. 19, 35: 
"The three-mile rule is but a recognition of the neces-
sity that a government next to the sea must be able to 
protect itself from dangers incident to its location. It 
must have powers of dominion and regulation in the 
interest of its revenues, its health, and the security of its 
people from wars waged on or too near its coasts. And in 
so far as the nation asserts its rights under international 
law, whatever of value may be discovered in the seas 
next to its shore and within its protective belt, will most 
naturally be appropriated for its use. But whatever any 
nation does in the open sea, which detracts from its com-
mon usefulness to nations, or which another nation may 
charge detracts from it, is a question for consideration 
among nations as such, and not their separate govern-
mental units." (Cited and re-affirmed in 1950 in United 
States v. State of Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 718.) 
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(c) The method of delimiting territorial waters is an ob-
jective one and, while the coastal State is free to make minor 
adjustments in its maritime frontier when required in the inter-
ests of clarity and its practical object, it is not authorized by the 
law to manipulate its maritime frontier in order to give effect 
to its economic and other social interests. There is an over-
whelming consensus of opinion amongst maritime States to the 
effect that the base-line of territorial waters, whatever their ex-
tent may be, is a line which follows the coast-line along low-water 
mark and not a series of imaginary lines drawn by the coastal 
State for the purpose of giving effect, even within reasonable 
limits, to its economic and other social interests and to other 
subjective factors. 
In 1894 Bon fils (Droit international public, Sec. 491) described 
la mer juridictionnelle ou littorale, as : 
"la bande de l'ocean qui entoure et enceint les cotes du 
territoire continental ou insulaire et sur laquelle l':Etat 
peut, du rivage que baignent les eaux de cette mer, faire 
respecter sa puissance". 
(d) The calculation of the extent of territorial waters from the 
land is the normal and natural thing to do; its calculation from a 
line drawn on the water is abnormal and requires justification, 
for instance, by showing that the line drawn on the water is drawn 
from the terminal line of internal waters in a closed bay or an 
historic bay or a river mouth, which will be dealt with later. One 
must not lose sight of the practical operation of the limit of ter-
ritorial waters. It is true that they exist for the benefit of the 
coastal State and not for that of the foreign mariner approaching 
them. Nevertheless, if he is to respect them, it is important that 
their limit should be drawn in such a way that, once he knows how 
many miles the coastal State claims, he should-whether he is a 
fisherman or the commander of a belligerent vessel in time of war 
-be able to keep out of them by following ordinary maritime 
practice in taking cross-bearings from points on th~ coast, when-
ever it is visible, or in some other way. This practical aspect of 
the matter is confirmed by the practice of Prize Courts in seeking 
to ascertain whether a prize has been captured within neutral ter-
ritorial waters or on the high seas; see, for instance, The A nne 
(1818) Prize Cases in the United States Supreme Court, page 
1012; The Heina (1915), Fauchille, Jurisprudence franr;aise en 
matiere de prises, I, page 119; II, page 409, a Norwegian ship 
captured by a French cruiser in 1914 at a point four miles and 
five-sixths from an island forming part of the Danish Antilles; and 
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by decisions upon illegal fishing within territorial waters, e.g. 
Ship May v. The King, Canada Law Reports, Supreme Court, 1931, 
page 37 4, or upon other illegal entry into territorial waters, The 
Ship "Queen City" v. The King, ibid., page 387. 
(e) Reference should also be made to the statement in the 
Report on Territorial Waters approved by the League Codifica-
tion Committee in 1927 for transmission to governments for their 
comments, particularly page 37 of League document C.196.M.70. 
1927.V., where, after referring to what it calls the seaward limit-
of the territorial sea, the Report continues: 
"Mention should also be made of the line which limits 
the rights of dominion of the riparian State on the land-
ward side. This question is much simpler. The general 
practice of the States, all projects of codification and the 
prevailing doctrine agree in considering that this line 
should be low-water mark along the whole of the coast." 
(f) In 1928 and 1929 replies were sent by a number of govern-
ments to the questions put to them by the Committee of Five 
which made the final preparations for the Hague Codification 
Conference of 1930 (League of Nations, C.74.M.39.1929.V., pp. 35 
et seq.). 
As I understand these replies-the language is not always ab-
solutely plain-seventeen governments declared themselves in 
favour of the view that the base-line of territorial waters is a line 
which follows the coast-line along low-water mark and against 
the view that the base-line consists of a series of lines connecting 
the outermost points of the mainland and islands. The following 
Governments took the latter view: Norway, Sweden, Poland, So-
viet Russia and, probably, Latvia. (In this respect my analysis 
corresponds closely to that of paragraph 298 of the Counter-
Memorial.) 
It may be added that Poland had recovered sovereignty over her 
maritime territory only eleven years before, after an interval of 
more than a century, and that Latvia became a State only in 1918. 
All the States parties to the North Sea Fisheries Convention of 
1882, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain and 
the Nether lands, as I understand their replies, accepted the rule 
of low-water mark following the line of the coast; so also did the 
United States of America. Governments are not prone to under-
state their claims. 
(g) It is also instructive to notice the Danish reply because · 
Denmark was, with Norway, the joint author of the Royal Decree ' 
of 1812, on which the Norwegian Decree of 1935 purports to be ,j 
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based, and Denmark told the League of Nations Committee that 
the Decree of 1812 was still in force in Denmark. The Danish 
reply states that: 
"Paragraph 2 of Article 3 of the regulations introduced 
by Royal Decree of January 19th, 1927, concerning the 
admission of war-vessels belonging to foreign Powers 
to Danish ports and territorial waters in time of peace, 
contains the following clause: 
'Danish internal waters comprise, in addition to 
the ports, entrances of ports, roadsteads, bays and 
firths, the waters situated between, and on the shore-
ward side of, islands, islets and reefs, which are not 
permanently submerged.' 
(Quotation from Decree of 1927 ends.) 
"Along the coast the low-water mark is taken as a base 
in determining the breadth of the territorial waters. The 
distance between the coast and the islands is not taken 
into account, so long as it is less than double the width of 
the territorial zone." 
(h) But although this rule of the limit following the coast line 
along low-water mark applies both to straight coasts and to 
curved and indented coasts, an exception exists in the case of 
those indentations which possess such a configuration, both as to 
their depth and as to the width between their headlands, as to 
constitute landlocked waters, by whatever name they may be 
called. It is usual and convenient to call them "bays", but what 
really matters is not their label but their shape. 
A recent recognition of the legal conception of bays is to be 
found in the reply of the United States of America given in 1949 
or 1950 to the International Law Commission, published by the 
United Nations in Document AjCN.4j19, page 104, of 23rd March, 
1950: 
"The United States has from the outset taken the posi-
tion that its territorial waters extend one marine league, 
or three geographical miles (nearly 31/2 English miles) 
from the shore, with the exception of waters or bays that 
are so landlocked as to be unquestionably within the juris-
diction of the adjacent State." 
(Then follow a large number of references illustrating this state-
ment.) 
There are two kinds of bay in which the maritime belt is 
measured from a closing line drawn across it between its head-
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lands, that is to say, at the point where it ceases to have the con-
figuration of a bay. The first category consists of bays whose head-
lands are so close that they can really be described as landlocked. 
According to the strict letter and logic of the law, a closing line 
should connect headlands whenever the distance between them is 
no more than double the agreed or admitted width of territorial 
waters, whatever that may be in the particular case. In practice, 
a somewhat longer distance between headlands has often been 
recognized as justifying the closing of a bay. There are a number-
of treaties that have adopted ten miles, in particular the Anglo-
French Convention of 1839, and the North Sea Fisheries Con-
vention of 1882, which was signed and ratified by Germany, Bel-
gium, Denmark, France, Great Britain and the Nether lands. It 
cannot yet be said that a closing line of ten miles forms part of a 
rule of customary law, though probably no reasonable objection 
could be taken to that figure. At any rate Norway is not bound by 
such a rule. But the fact that there is no agreement upon the 
figure does not mean that no rule at all exists as to the closing line 
of curvatures possessing the character of a bay, and that a State 
can do what it likes with its bays; for the primary rule governing 
territorial waters is that they form a belt or bande de mer follow-
ing the line of the coast throughout its extent, and if any State 
alleges that this belt ought not to come inside a particular bay and 
follow its configuration, then it is the duty of that State to show 
why that bay forms an exception to this general rule. 
The other category of bay whose headlands may be joined for 
the purpose of fencing off the waters on the landward side as in-
ternal waters is the historic bay, and to constitute an historic bay 
it does not suffice merely to claim a bay as such, though such claims 
are not uncommon .. Evidence is required of a long and consistent 
assertion of dominion over the bay and of the right to exclude 
foreign vessels except on permission. The matter was considered 
by the British Privy Council in the case of Conception Bay in 
Newfoundland in Direct United States Cable Company v. Anglo-
American Telegraph Company (1877) 2 Appeal Cases 394. The 
evidence relied upon in that case as justifying the claim of an 
historic bay is worth noting. There was a Convention of 1818 be-
tween the United States of America and Great Britain which ex-
cluded American fishermen from Conception Bay, followed by a 
British Act of Parliament of 1819, imposing penalties upon "any 
person" who refused to depart from the bay when required by 
the British Governor. The Privy Council said: 
"It is true that the Convention would only bind the two 
nations who were parties to it, and consequently that, 
though a strong assertion of ownership on the part of 
Great Britain, acquiesced in by so powerful a State as 
the United States, the Convention, though weighty, is not 
decisive. But the Act already referred to . . . . goes 
further" . . . . "No stronger assertion of exclusive do-
minion over these bays could well be framed." [This 
Act] "is an unequivocal assertion of the British legisla-
ture of exclusive dominion over this bay as part of the 
British territory. And as this assertion of dominion has 
not been questioned by any nation from 1819 down to 
1872, when a fresh Convention was made, this would be 
very strong in the tribunals of any nation to show that 
this bay is by prescription part of the exclusive territory 
of Great Britain. . . ." 
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Claims to fence off and appropriate areas of the high seas by 
joining up headlands have been made from time to time, but 
usually in the case of particular pieces of water and not on the 
thoroughgoing scale of the Decree of 1935. There is a considerable 
body of legal authority condemning this practice. This theory-
to the effect that the coastal State is at liberty to draw a line con-
necting headlands on its coast and to claim the waters on the 
landward side of that line as its own waters-has sometimes been 
referred to as the "headland theory" or "la theorie" or "la doctrine 
des caps". 
There are two decisions by an umpire called Bates in arbitra-
tions between the United States of America and the United King-
dom in 1853 or 1854 (Moore's International Arbitrations, Vol. 4, 
pp. 4342-5) : the Washington, seized while fishing within a line 
connect~ng the headlands of the Bay of Fundy, which is 65 to 75 
miles wide and 130 to 140 miles long and "has several bays on its 
coasts", and the Argus, seized while fishing 28 miles from the 
nearest land and within a line connecting two headlands on the 
north-east side of the island of Cape Breton; I dq not know the 
distance between them. In both cases, the seizures were condemned 
and compensation was awarded to the owners of the vessels. In the 
Washington the umpire said: 
"It was urged on behalf of the British Government that 
by coasts, bays, etc., is understood an imaginary line, 
drawn along the coast from headland to headland, and 
that the jurisdiction of Her Majesty extends three marine 
miles outside of this line; thus closing all the bays on the 
coast or shore, and that great body of water called the 
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Bay of Fundy against Americans and others, making the 
latter a British bay. This doctrine of headlands is new, 
and has received a proper limit in the Convention between 
France and Great Britain of August 2nd, 1839, in which 
'it is agreed that the distance of three miles fixed as the 
limit for the exclusive right of fishery upon the coasts 
of the two countries shall, with respect to bays the 
mouths of which do not exceed ten miles in width, be 
measured from a straight line drawn from headland to 
headland.' " 
Then, in 1881, Mr. Evarts, American Secretary of State, sent 
a despatch to the American representative in Spain which con- · 
tained the following passage (Moore's Digest of International 
Law, i, p. 719) : 
"Whether the line which bounds seaward the three-mile 
zone follows the indentations of the coast or extends from 
headland to headland is the question next to be dis-
cussed. 
The headland theory, as it is called, has been uniformly 
rejected by our Government, as will be seen from the 
opinions of the Secretaries above referred to. The follow-
ing additional authorities may be cited on this point: 
In the opinion of the umpire of the London Commis-
sion of 1853 [I think he refers to the Washington or the 
Argus], it was held that: 'It can not be asserted as a gen-
eral rule, that nations have an exclusive right of fishery 
over all adjacent waters to a distance of three marine 
miles beyond an imaginary line drawn from headland to 
headland.' " 
He concluded: 
"We may therefore regard it as settled that, so far as 
concerns the eastern coast of North America, the position 
of this Department has uniformly been that the sover-
eignty of the shore does not, so far as territorial author-
ity is concerned, extend beyond three miles from low-
water mark, and that the seaward boundary of this zone 
of territorial waters follows the coast of the mainland, 
extending where there are islands so as to place round 
such islands the same belt. This necessarily excludes the 
position that the seaward boundary is to be drawn from 
headland to headland, and makes it follow closely, at a 
distance of three miles, the boundary of the shore of the 
continent or of adjacent islands belonging to the con-
tinental sovereign." 
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And "la theorie des caps" is condemned by Fauchille. Droit 
international public, para. 493 ( 6), in the words: "Elle ne saurait 
juridiquement prevaloir: elle est une atteinte manifeste a la 
liberte des mers." 
* * * 
I shall now examine the Decree of 1935 and direct attention to 
the results produced by the "straight base-lines" which it lays 
down. It is difficult without the visual aid of large-scale charts 
to convey a correct picture of the base-lines and the outer lines 
of delimitation established by the Decree of 1935. The area affected 
begins at Traena on the north-west coast not far from the en-
trance to Vestfjord and runs round North Cape down to the 
fr.ontier with Russia near Grense-J acobselv, the total length of 
the outer line being about 560 sea miles without counting fjords 
and other indentations. There are 48 fixed points-often arbitrar-
ily selected-between which the base-lines are drawn. Twelve of 
these base-points are located on the mainland or islands, 36 of 
then1 on rocks or reefs. Some of the rocks are drying rocks and 
some permanently above water. The length of the base-lines and 
the corresponding outer lines varies greatly. At some places, 
where there are two or more rocks at a turning point, the length 
of the base-lines may be only a few cables. At other places the 
length is very great, for instance, 
between 5 and 6. .. . . . . 25 miles 
7 " 8. 19 " .. 
8 " 9. 25 " . . 
11 " 12. 39 " 
12 " 13. 19 " 
18 " 19. 261;2 " .. 
19 " 20. 19.6 " 
20 " 21. 44 " .. 
21 " 22. 18 " 
25 " 26. 191;2 " .. . . 
27 " 28 ... 18 " . . . . . . . . .. 
I have omitted the base-lines connecting base-points 1 and 2 
and base-points 45 and 46, which are respectively 30 and 40 miles, 
because they are the closing lines of Varangerfjord and Vestfjord, 
and these fjords, like the others, have been conceded by the United 
Kingdom to be Norwegian waters, subject to a minor controversy 
118 
as to the precise position of the closing line of the latter. I have 
also omitted mention of all base-lines less than 18 miles. 
The base-line connecting base-points 20 and 21 ( 44 miles) 
rests for a brief moment upon Vesterfall in Gasan (21), a drying 
rock eight miles from the nearest island, and then continues, with 
an almost imperceptible bend, in the same direction for a further 
18 miles to base point 22, a drying rock; thus between base-points 
20 and 22 we get an almost completely straight line of 62 miles. _ 
Again, the base-line which connects base-points 18 and 20, both 
above-water rocks, runs absolutely straight for 46.1 miles. 
In order to illustrate the distance between many parts on the 
outer lines and the land, I shall take two sectors which I find . 
particularly difficult to reconcile with the ordinary conception 
of the maritime belt-namely, that comprised by base-points 11 
and 12 (39 miles apart), an area sometimes called Svaerholthavet, 
and that comprised by base-points 20 and 21 ( 44 miles apart), 
an area sometimes called Lopphavet. In each case I propose to pro-
ceed along the outer line and take, at intervals of 4 miles, measure-
ments in miles from the outer line to the nearest mainland or on 
an island: 
Svaerholthavet: Measurements to mainland or islands from 
the outer line, at intervals of 4 miles proceeding from base-point 
11 to base-point 12 are as follows: 4 miles at base-point 11, then 
5Ys, 8Ys, 11, 13, 12 (or 11 from a lighthouse), 11 (or 9 from a 
lighthouse) , 8, 6, and nearly 5 ; 
Lopphavet: Measurements to mainland or islands from the 
outer line, at intervals of 4 miles proceeding from 20 to 21, are as 
follows: 4 miles at base-point 20, then 6, 81/2, 12, 16, 16, 18, 17, 
141/2, 121/2 (or 8 from base-point 21, a drying rock), 12 (or 5 from 
base-point 21) . 
Moreover, each of these two areas-Svaerholthavet and Lop-
phavet-in no sense presents the configuration of a bay and com-
prises a large number of named and unnamed fjords and sunds 
which have been admitted by the United Kingdom to be Nor-
wegian internal waters within their proper closing lines. In one 
part of Lopphavet the outer line is distant more than 20 miles 
from the closing line of a fjord. In the opinion of the Court (see 
p. 141) Lopphavet "cannot be regarded as having the character 
of a bay"; and I may refer to an additional circumstance which 
militates against the opinion that the whole of this large area is 
Norwegian waters: that is, that according to the (British Ad-
miralty) Norway Pilot, Part III, page 607, the approach to the ' 
port of Hammerfest through Soroysundet, which runs out of 
Lopphavet towards Hammerfest, "is the shortest and, on the 
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whole, the best entrance to Hammerfest from westward, especially 
in bad weather"; see The Alleganean (Moore, International Ar-
bitrations, iv, pp. 4332-4341, "that it can not become the pathway 
from one nation to another"-as one of the conditions for holding 
Chesapeake Bay to be a closed historic bay) . Another questionable 
area is that comprised by the lines connecting base-points 24 and 
26, totalling 36 miles. 
These three illustrations are among the extreme cases. A more 
normal base-line is that which connects base-points 5 (a point 
on the island of Reinoy) and 6 ( Korsneset, a headland on the main-
land) ; this base-line-25 miles in length-runs in front of Pers-
fjord, Syltefjord and Makkaufjord, all of which have been ad-
mitted by the United Kingdom to be Norwegian internal waters, 
but the line pays no attention to their closing lines; at no place, 
however, is the distance between the outer line and the land or 
closing line of a fjord more than about six miles. 
I draw particular attention to the fact that many, if not most, 
of the base-lines of the Decree of 1935 fence off many areas of 
water which contain fjords or bays, and pay little, if any, atten-
tion to their closing lines; in the case of the Washington, referred 
to above, the umpire, in rejecting the claim to treat the Bay of 
Fundy as a closed bay, twice drew attention to the fact that it 
comprised other bays within itself: "It has several bays on its 
coasts", and again he refers to "the imaginary line . . . . thus 
closing all the bays on the shore." 
The result of the lines drawn by the Decree is to produce a col-
lection of areas of water, of different shapes and sizes and differ-
ent lengths and widths, which are far from forming a belt or bande 
of territorial waters as commonly understood. I find it difficult to 
reconcile such a pattern of territorial waters with the almost uni-
versal practice of defining territorial waters in terms of miles-
be they three or four or some other number. Why speak of three 
miles or four miles if a State is at liberty to draw lines which 
produce a maritime belt that is three or four miles wide at the 
base-points and hardly anywhere else? Why speak of measuring 
territorial waters from low-water mark when that occurs at 48 
base-points and hardly anywhere else? It is said that this pattern 
is the inevitable consequence of the configuration of the Nor-
wegian coast, but I shall show later that this is not so. 
* * * 
Norway has sought to justify the Decree of 1935 on a variety of 
grounds, of which the principal are the following (A, B, C and D) : 
(A) That a State has a right to delimit its territorial waters 
in the manner required to protect its economic and other social 
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interests. This is a novelty to me. It reveals one of the funda-
mental issues which divide the Parties, namely, the difference 
between the subjective and the objective views of the delimitation 
of territorial waters. 
In my opinion the manipulation of the limits of territorial 
waters for the purpose of protecting economic and other social 
interests has no justification in law; moreover, the approbation 
of such a practice would have a dangerous tendency in that it_ 
would encourage States to adopt a subjective appreciation of their 
rights instead of conforming to a common international standard. 
* * * 
(B) That the pattern of territorial waters resulting from the 
Decree of 1935 is required by the exceptional character of the 
Norwegian coast. 
Much has been said and written in presenting the Norwegian i 
case for the delimitation made by the Decree of 1935 of the special 
character of the Norwegian coast, the poverty and barrenness of 
the land in northern Norway, and the vital importance of fishing 
to the population, and so forth, and of the skerries and "Skjaer-
gaard", which runs round the south, west and north coasts and 
ends at North Cape (Norwegian oral argument, 11th October). 
This plea must be considered in some detail from the point of view 
both of fact and of law. Norway has no monopoly of indentations 
or even of skerries. A glance at an atlas will shew that, although 
Norway has a very long and heavily indented coast-line, there 
are many countries in the world possessing areas of heavily in-
dented coast-line. It is not necessary to go beyond the British 
Commonwealth. The coast of Canada is heavily indented in almost 
every part. Nearly the whole of the west coast of Scotland and 
much of the west coast of Northern Ireland is heavily indented 
and bears much resemblance to the Norwegian coast. 
Skerry is a word of Norwegian origin which abounds in Scot-
land, both as "skerry" and as "sgeir" (the Gaelic form). The New 
Oxford Dictionary and any atlas of Scotland afford many illus-
trations. From this dictionary I extract two quotations: Scoresby, 
Journal of Whale Fishery (1823), page 373: "The islands, or 
skerries, which . . . . skirt the forbidding coast on the western 
side of the Hebrides"; W. Mcilwraith, Guide to Wigtownshire 
(1875) (in the southwest of Scotland), page 62: "The rocks ~~ 
stretch seaward in rugged ledges and skerries." The following 
passage occurs in the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1947), Volume :j 
20, sub-title "Scotland", page 141: "The Western Highland coast ' 
is intersected throughout by long narrow sea-lochs or fjords. 
The mainland slopes steeply into the sea and is fronted by chains ·I 
:I 
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and groups of islands .... The Scottish sea-lochs must be con-
sidered in connection with those of western Ireland and Norway. 
The whole of this north-western coast line of Europe bears witness 
to recent submergence." 
As was demonstrated to the Court by means of charts, in re-
I sponse to a suggestion contained in paragraph 527 of the Counter-
Memorial, the north-west coast of Scotland is not only heavily in-
, dented but it possesses, in addition, a modest "island fringe", the 
Outer Hebrides, extending from the Butt of Lewis in a south-
westerly direction to Barra Head for a distance of nearly one 
• hundred miles, the southern tip being about thirty-five miles from 
the Skerryvore lighthouse. At present the British line of territorial 
waters round this island fringe, inside and outside of it, follows 
the line of the coast and the islands throughout without difficulty 
and does not, except for the closing lines of lochs not exceeding 
' ten miles, involve straight base-lines joining the outermost points 
1 of the islands. This is also true of the heavily indented and moun-
tainous mainland of the north-west coast of Scotland lying inside 
1 of and opposite to the Outer Hebrides. 
! A further factor that must be borne in mind, in assessing the 
, relevance of the special character of the Norwegian coast, is that 
I 
1 not very much of that special character remains after the admis-
sions (referred to above) made by the United Kingdom during 
I the course of the oral proceedings. The main peculiarity that re-
mains is the jagged outer edge of the island fringe or "skj aer-
gaard". In estimating the effect of the "skjaergaard" as a special 
I factor, it must also be remembered that, running north-west, it 
ends at North Cape, which is near base-point 12. 
Another special aspect of the Norwegian coast which has been 
stressed in the Norwegian argument, and is mentioned in the 
Judgment of the Court, is its mountainous character; for instance, 
Professor Bourquin said on October 5th: 
"The shore involved in the dispute is an abrupt coast 
towering high above the level of the sea; that fact is of 
great importance to our case. It is therefore a coast which 
can be seen from a long way off. A mariner approaching 
from the sea catches sight of a mountainous coast, like 
this of Norway, very soon. From this point of view a 
coast like this of Norway cannot be compared with a flat 
coast such as that, for example, of the Netherlands." 
The Norwegian argument also repeatedly insists that the base-
lines of the Decree of 1935 have been so drawn that the land is 
visible from every point on the outer line. I am unable to see the 
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relevance of this point because I am aware of no principle or rule 
of law which allows a wider belt of territorial waters to a country 
possessing a mountainous coast, such as Norway, than it does to 
one possessing a fiat coast, such as the Nether lands. 
In brief, for the following reasons, I am unable to reconcile 
the Decree of 1935 with the conception of territorial waters as 
recognized by international law-
(a) because the delimitation of territorial waters by the Decree 
of 1935 is inspired, amongst other factors, by the policy of pro-
tecting the economic and other social interests of the coastal 
State; 
(b) because, except at the precise 48 base-points, the limit of . 
four miles is measured not from land but from imaginary lines 
drawn in the sea, which pay little, if any, attention to the closing 
lines of lawfully enclosed indentations such as fjords, except 
V arangerfj ord and V estfj ord ; 
(c) because the Decree of 1935, so far from attempting to 
delimit the belt or bande of maritime territory attributed by , 
international law to every coastal State, comprises within its 
limits areas of constantly varying distances from the outer line 
to the land and bearing little resemblance to a belt or bande; 
(d) because the Decree of 1935 ignores the practical need 
experienced from time to time of ascertaining, in the manner cus-
tomary amongst mariners, whether a foreign ship is or is not 
within the limit of territorial waters. 
* * * 
(C) That the United Kingdom is precluded from objecting to 
the Norwegian system embodied in the Decree of 1935 by previous 
acquiescence in the system. 
Supposing that so peculiar a system could, in any part of the 
world and at any period of time, be recognized as a lawful system 
of the delimitation of territorial waters, the question would arise 
whether the United Kingdom had precluded herself from objecting 
to it by acquiescing in it. An answer to that question involves 
two questions : 
When did the dispute arise? 
When, if at all, did the United Kingdom Government become 
aware of this system, or when ought it to have become aware but 
for its own neglect; in English legal terminology, when did it re-
ceive actual or constructive notice of the system? 
When did the dispute arise? Three dates require consideration: 
1906, 1908 and 1911. I do not think it greatly matters which we ' 
take. As for 1906, Chapter IV of the Counter-Memorial is entitled 
"History of the Dispute since 1906". The Starting Document No. • 
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17/1927 (to be described later) says (p. 122) that "in 1905 Eng-
lish trawlers began to fish in the waters along northern Norway 
and Russia", and the Counter-Memorial, paragraph 91, states that 
"British trawlers made their first appearance off the coast of 
Eastern FinnmarK towards 1906". Some apprehension occurred 
among the local population. A Law of June 2, 1906, prohibiting 
foreigners from fishing in Norwegian territorial waters, was 
passed, and "since 1907, fishery protection vessels have been sta-
tioned every year in the waters of Northern Norway" (ibidem, 
paragraph 93) . 
As for 1908, Norwegian Counsel told the Court (October 25) 
that "as early as 1908 Norway organized its fishery patrol service 
on the basis of the very lines which were subsequently fixed in the 
1935 Decree." It is strange that these lines were not communicated 
to the United Kingdom in 1908. According to Annex 56 of the 
Counter-Memorial, a Report made by the General Chief of Staff of 
the Norwegian Navy, 
"The instructions given to the naval fishery protection 
vessels as early as 1906 specified two forms of action to 
be taken in regard to trawlers: warning and arrest. 
The first warning, after the trawlers had begun to visit 
our Arctic waters, was given in the summer of 1908 to 
the British trawler Golden Sceptre." 
As for 1911, on March 11th of that year, when the British 
trawler Lord Roberts was arrested in Varangerfjord and the 
master was fined for breach of the Law of 2nd June, 1906, Notes 
were exchanged between the British and Norwegian Governments 
and the Norwegian Foreign Minister had an interview with Sir 
Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, in London. At that 
interview, the Norwegian Minister, M. Irgens, "insisted on the 
desirability of England not at that moment lodging a \vritten 
protest" (ibidem, paragraph 98 a), but on the 11th July, 1911, the 
British Government sent a protest to Norway (Counter-Memorial, 
Annex 35, No. 1), in which they maintained that they had "never 
recognized the Varanger and the Vest fjords to be territorial 
waters, nor have they participated in any international agree-
ment for the purpose of conferring the right of jurisdiction be-
l yond the three-mile limit off any part of the Norwegian coasts". 
On October 13th, 1951, Mr. Arntzen said in the course of his oral 
argument: 
"The "Norwegian Government is happy to see the dis-
pute which has lasted so long submitted for the decision 
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of the International Court of Justice. I think it may be
relevant to recall that M. Irgens, the Norwegian Foreign
Minister, at the time of his discussions [that is, in 1911]
with Sir Edward Grey concerning the Lord Roberts inci-
dent in 1911, was already speaking of the possibility of
arbitration as a solution to the dispute."
In later years many other trawlers were arrested, and the
dispute widened, but it was not until during the course of these
proceedings that the United Kingdom admitted that the waters of
Varangerfjord within the line claimed by Norway were Norwegian
waters.
Between the arrest of the Lord Roberts in 1911 and May 5th,
1949, sixty-three British and other fishing vessels were arrested
for fishing in alleged Norwegian waters, and many others were
warned (see Counter-Memorial, Annex 56).
I must now examine the Decrees on which the Decree of 1935
purports to be based and some of which have been mentioned as
evidence that the United Kingdom had acquired or ought to have
acquired notice of the Norwegian system before the dispute
began.
(i) The Royal Decree of February 22nd, 1812. The Storting
Document No. 17/1927 tells us (pp. 506, 507) that after dis-
cussion between the Admiralty and Foreign Office of the Kingdom
of Denmark-Norway, it was decided to request the King for a
royal resolution and the Chancellery defined the matter to be
"whether the territorial sovereignty, or the point from
which the sovereign right of protection is fixed, shall be
measured from the mainland or from the extremest
skerries".
Thereupon the King of Denmark and of Norway made the
Decree, of which a translation will be found on page 134 of the
Judgment of the Court. The Decree makes no mention of straight
lines between islands or islets, or of connecting headlands of the
mainland by any lines at all.
This is the first of the Decrees mentioned in the preamble as
the basis of the Decree of 1935, and it has been treated by the
Norwegian Agent and Counsel as the basis and the starting-point
of a series of Decrees made in the 19th century and of the Decree
of 1935—a kind of Magna Carta. The Judgment of the Court
attributes "cardinal importance" to it. It therefore deserves close
examination. For this purpose, I must refer again to Storting
Document No. 17/1927, which is a Report made by one section
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of the "Enlarged Committee on Foreign Affairs and Constitution
of the Norwegian Storting'' in April 1927, later translated into
English and then printed and published by Sijthoff in Leyden in
1937, under the title of The Extent of Jurisdiction in Coastal
Waters, by Chrisopher B.V. Meyer, Captain, Royal Norwegian
Navy.
On pages 492 ff., this document passes under review a large
number of 17th and 18th-century Decrees and Proclamations,
amongst others that of June 9, 1691 (Annex 6, I, to the Counter-
Memorial), and another of June 13, 1691 (Annex 6, II) which, it
will be noticed, refers to the area between the Naze in Norway
and the Jutland Reef. It then refers to the Decree of 1812 and tells
us that it was "not in reality intended to be more than a regulation
for the actual purpose: prize cases on the southern coasts".
Further, on page 507, we are told that the Royal Resolution "was
communicated .... to all the Governors in Denmark and Nor-
way whose jurisdictions border the sea, all the prize courts in
Denmark and Norway and the Royal Supreme Admiralty Court".
It was communicated "for information" with the additional order
:
"yet nothing of this must be published in printing".
Page 507 contains the following footnote:
"( ) N.R.A. Chanc, drafts. As far as is known, the
resolution was printed for the first time in 1830 in His-
torisk underretning om landvaernet by J. Chr. Berg.
Dr. Raestad states that up to that time it was little known
and apparently no appeal was made to it previously,
either in Denmark or in Norway."
Then follow several quotations from Dr. Raestad's Kongens
Stromme, commenting on the expression "in all cases", which
should be noted because his interpretation of "in all cases" differs
from that about to be quoted from this document, and because Dr.
Raestad stated that, though the Decree of 1812 "was intended
for neutrality questions", "the one-league limit at that time was
the actual limit—at any rate the actual minimum limit—also for
other purposes than for neutrality." We are then told (p. 509)
that
"in the light of the most recent investigations it seems
quite clear that the term 'in all cases' only means 'in all
prize cases'. The Resolution of 22nd February 1812,
only completed the foregoing neutrality rescripts by de-
ciding the question which was left open in 1759 : whether
the league should be measured from terra firma or from
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the appurtenant skerries, etc. The one-league limit of
1812 had, therefore, no greater scope than the one-
league limit mentioned in the previous Royal Resolutions
of the 18th century, that is to say, it applied only to neu-
trality questions, and was laid down only for the guidance
of national authorities, not of foreign Powers."
The relevance of these passages is that they shew
:
(a) that the Decree of 1812 was little known for some 18 years
;
(b) that it was intended for administrative purposes and not
for the guidance of foreign States;
(c) that, in the opinion of some people, it only applied to
prize cases and even then, according to this document, only to
prize cases on the southern coasts. On page 510 the Report speaks
of "the prize case rule of 22nd February, 1812".
It is clear that between 1869 and 1935 "the prize case rule
of 22nd February, 1812" was acquiring a wider connotation, as
we shall now see.
It does not matter whether the views expressed in the Storting
Document No. 17/1927 as to the meaning of the Royal Decree of
1812 are right or wrong. What is important from the point of view
of the alleged notoriety of the Norwegian system is that such
views as to the true import of the Decree of 1812 and its connec-
tion with the Norwegian system could be held by responsible
persons in Norway as late as the year 1927.
(ii) The Les Quatre Freres incident in 1868. This French fish-
ing boat was turned out of the Vestfjord by the Norwegian author-
ities. The French Government protested on the ground that the
Vestfjord was not part of Norwegian territorial waters and
"serves as a passage for navigation towards the North". Corre-
spondence between the two Governments ensued, and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs of Norway and Sweden on November 7th,
1868, claimed Vestfjord "as an interior sea", which appears to
have closed the incident.
(iii) A Royal Decree of October 16th, 1869, provided
"That a straight line drawn at a distance of 1 geo-
graphical league parallel to a straight line running from
the islet of Storholmen to the island of Svinoy shall be
considered to be the limit of the sea belt for the coast of
the Bailiwick of Sunnmore, within which the fishing shall
be exclusively reserved to the inhabitants of the country."
This, according to Professor Bourquin (October 6), was the
first application of the Decree of 1812 to fishing. The straight
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base-line connecting the two islands above mentioned was 26
miles in length.
The Counter-Memorial contains in Annex 16 a Statement of
Reasons submitted by the Minister of the Interior to the Crown
dated October 1st, 1869, about which a few very much compressed
comments must be made. Firstly, it represents the cry of the small
man in the open boat against the big man in the decked boat. It
says that the area in question "has of recent years been invaded
by a growing number of decked vessels, both Swedish and Nor-
wegian cutters, from which fishing was practised with heavy
lines", etc. Apparently the Swedes began it in 1866 and the Nor-
wegians followed suit. Another passage states that the local
fishermen "bitterly complained of the fact that intruders on the
fishing grounds previously visited exclusively by Norwegians were
mainly foreigners—Swedes". The fear was also expressed that
fishing boats from other countries, especially France, might soon
appear on the fishing banks. Accordingly, the Minister had been
asked "to form an opinion on the possibility of claiming them as
Norwegian property". (The reference to France was probably
prompted by the Vestfjord incident of the previous year which
would be fresh in the departmental mind.)
The Statement of Reasons invokes the precedent of the
Decree of 1812. In addition, there is a letter of November 1st,
1869 (Annex No. 28 to the Counter-Memorial) from the Nor-
wegian Minister of the Interior to the Swedish Minister of Civil
Affairs, informing him of the Decree made on the 16th instant
(? ultimo), and it contains the passage: "it has been desired to
bring this matter to the notice of the Royal Ministry in order that
the latter may publish the information in those Swedish districts
from which the fishing fleets set out for the Norwegian coast".
(There is no evidence of any notification of the Decree to any other
State.) The penultimate sentence in this letter is as follows:
"Moreover, if the fishery in these areas were left
open, there is reason to believe that the fishermen of many
foreign countries would visit them, with the result of a
diminution of the products of the fishery for everybody".
The Decree was a public document. A large part of the State-
ment of Reasons is quoted in the Norwegian Report of a Com-
mission on the Delimitation of Territorial Waters of 1912, but,
so far as I am aware, the Statement of Reasons was not published
at the time of making the Decree.
The French Government
—
probably on the qui-vive by reason
of the Vestfjord incident of the previous year—became aware of
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the Decree of 1869 two months later and a diplomatic correspond-
ence between the two Governments ensued, in which the French
Government contended that "the limits for fishing between
[Svindy and Storholmen] should have been a broken line following
the configuration of the coast which would have brought it nearer
that coast than the present limit. ,, The last item in this corre-
spondence is a Note from the French Charge d'Affaires at Stock-
holm to the Foreign Minister of Norway and Sweden, dated July
27, 1870, which referred to "the future consequences .... that
might follow from our adhesion to the principles laid down in the
Decree", and stated that "this danger .... could easily be
avoided if it were understood that the limit fixed by the Decree
of October 16th does not rest upon a principle of international
law, but upon a practical study of the configuration of the coasts
and of the conditions of the inhabitants", and offered to recognize
the delimitation de facto and to join in "a common survey of the
coasts to be entrusted to two competent naval officers". It would
appear that the French Government wished to protect itself
against a de jure recognition of principle. Meanwhile, on July 19,
the Franco-Prussian war had broken out, and there the matter
has rested ever since.
(iv) A Royal Decree of September 9th, 1889, extended the
limit fixed by the Decree of 1869 northward in front of the dis-
tricts of Romsdal and Nordmore by means of a series of four
straight lines, connecting islands, totalling about 57 miles, so that
the two Decrees of 1869 and 1889 established straight base-lines
of a total length of about 83 miles. The Decree of 1889 was also
motivated by a Statement of Reasons submitted by the Minister of
the Interior to the Crown, which was included in a publication
called Departements-Tidende of March 9, 1890. This Statement of
Reasons, which also refers to the Decree of 1812, indicates the
necessity of empowering the Prefect responsible for Nordmore
and Romsdal to make regulations prohibiting fishing boats from
lying at anchor at certain points on the fishing grounds during
February and March. It makes no reference to foreign vessels.
The question thus arises whether the two Decrees of 1869 and
1889, affecting a total length of maritime frontier of about 83
miles, and connecting islands but not headlands of the mainland,
ought to have been regarded by foreign States when they became
aware of them, or ought but for default on their part to have be-
come aware, as notice that Norway had adopted a peculiar system
of delimiting her maritime territory, which in course of time
would be described as having been from the outset of universal
application throughout the whole coast line amounting (without
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taking the sinuosities of the fjords into account) to about 3,400
kilometres (about 1,830 sea-miles), or whether these Decrees
could properly be regarded as regulating a purely local, and
primarily domestic, situation. I do not see how these two Decrees
can be said to have notified to the United Kingdom the existence
of a system of straight base-lines applicable to the whole coast.
In the course of the oral argument, Counsel for the United King-
dom admitted that the United Kingdom acquiesced in the lines
laid down by these Decrees as lines applicable to the areas which
they cover.
(v) A Decree of January 5th, 1881, prohibited whaling during
the first five months of each calendar year
"along the coasts of Finnmark, at a maximum distance
of one geographical league from the coast, calculating
this distance from the outermost island or islet, which is
not covered by the sea. As regards the Varangerfjord,
the limit out to sea of the prohibited belt is a straight line,
drawn from Cape Kibergnes to the River Grense-Jakob-
selv. It must thereby be understood, however, that the
killing or hunting of whales during the above-mentioned
period will also be prohibited beyond that line at dis-
tances of less than one geographical league from the coast
near Kibergnes."
Thus, while expressly fixing a straight base-line across the
mouth of the Varangerfjord (which is no longer in dispute
in this case) , the Decree makes no suggestion and gives no indi-
cation that it instituted a system of straight base-lines from
the outermost points on the mainland and islands and rocks at any
other part "along the coasts of Finnmark'\ I find it difficult to
see how this Decree can be said to have given notice of a Nor-
wegian system of straight base-lines from Traena in the west to
the Russian frontier in the east.
(vi) The 1881 Hague Conference regarding Fisheries in the
North Sea resulting in the Convention of 1882. The Judgment of
the Court refers to this incident and draws certain conclusions
from it. This Conference was summoned upon the initiative of
Great Britain with a view to the signature of a Convention as to
policing the fisheries in the North Sea. The following States
were represented: Germany, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great
Britain, Sweden, Norway, the delegate of the last-named being
M.E. Bretteville, Naval Lieutenant and Chief Inspector of Herring
Fishery. The intention was that the Convention should operate
on the high seas and not in territorial waters, and consequently
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it was necessary to define the extent of the territorial waters
within the area affected. The proces-verbaux of the meetings are
to be found in a British White Paper C. 3238, published in 1882.
The northern limit of the operation of the Convention was
fixed by Article 4 at the parallel of the 61st degree of latitude,
which is south of the area in dispute in this case.
At the second session of the Conference, the question of Ter-
ritorial Waters was discussed, and the following statement appears
in the proces-verbaux:
"The Norwegian delegate, M.E. Bretteville, could not
accept the proposal to fix territorial limits at 3 miles, par-
ticularly with respect to bays. He was also of opinion that
the international police ought not to prejudice the rights
which particular Powers might have acquired, and that
bays should continue to belong to the State to which they
at present belong."
Strictly speaking, there was no need for the Norwegian dele-
gate to refer to the Decree of 1869 because the Convention deals
with the area south of the parallel of the 61st degree of latitude,
but if a system of straight base-lines had already been adopted
by Norway in 1881 as being of general application all round the
coast, it is surprising that he made no reference to it at a Con-
ference at which all the States primarily interested in fishing in
the North Sea were represented, and as a result of which all,
except Norway and Sweden, accepted the provisions of Article II
of the Convention, of which the following is an extract
:
"Article II
"The fishermen of each country shall enjoy the exclu-
sive right of fishery within the distance of 3 miles from
low-water mark along the whole extent of the coasts of
their respective countries, as well as of the dependent
islands and banks.
"As regards bays, the distance of 3 miles shall be meas-
ured from a straight line drawn across the bay, in the
part nearest the entrance, at the first point where the
width does not exceed 10 miles."
The Convention was eventually signed and ratified by all the
States represented except Norway and Sweden.
This incident, to which I attach particular importance, induces
me to put two questions
:
(a) If a Norwegian system of delimiting territorial waters by
means of straight base-lines had been in existence since 1869
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(only 12 years earlier), could the Norwegian delegate, the Chief
Inspector of Herring Fishery, have found a more suitable op-
portunity of disclosing its existence than a Conference of Gov-
ernments interested in fishing in the North Sea? In fact, could
he have failed to do so if the system existed, for it would have
afforded a conclusive reason for inability to participate in the
Convention of 1882?
(b) Could any of the Governments which ratified this Con-
vention, knowing that Norway claimed four miles as the width
of territorial waters and claimed her fjords as internal waters, be
affected by the abstention of Norway with notice of the existence
of a system which one day in the future would disclose long
straight base-lines drawn along a stretch of coast line abcut 560
miles in length (without counting fjords and other indentations),
and which is applicable to the whole coast?
* *
Paragraph 96 of the Counter-Memorial, in discussing the events
of the year 1908, states that
"it may be asked why Norway did not from the begin-
ning use force on all her territorial waters to apply the
existing laws relating to foreign fishermen ,\ . . . "In
this respect it must be remembered that Norway had but
recently acquired a separate diplomatic service, follow-
ing the dissolution of the union with Sweden in 1905."
It is possible that this fact may explain the absence of any cate-
gorical assertion of the Norwegian system of straight base-
lines as a system of universal application along the Norwegian
coasts and the notification of that system to foreign States. But
even if this is the explanation, it is difficult to see why it should
constitute a reason why foreign States should be affected by
notice of this system and precluded from protesting against it
when it is enforced against them.
* * *
In these circumstances, I do not consider that the United King-
dom was aware, or ought but for default on her part to have
become aware, of the existence of a Norwegian system of long
straight base-lines connecting outermost points, before this dis-
pute began in 1906 or 1908 or 1911.
* * *
I must refer very briefly to certain incidents occurring after
the dispute began, though they have no bearing on the question
of acquiescence. Some of them are dealt with in the Judgment
of the Court or in other Individual Opinions.
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In 1911, the Norwegian Government appointed a "Commission
for the Limits of Territorial Waters in Finnmark", which re-
ported on February 29th, 1912. A copy of Part I, General, was
translated into French and sent "unofficially" to the United King-
dom Government.
The following passage occurs on page 20 of this Part I:
"En general, dans les cas particuliers, on prendra le
plus surement une decision en conformite avec la vielle
notion juridique norvegienne, si Ton considere la ligne
fondamentale comme etant tiree entre les points les plus
extremes dont il pourrait etre question, nonobstant la
longueur de la ligne."
This, is clearly the language of a proposal. The tenses of the
verbs should be noted.
On the same day, "the Commission presented Report No. 2
'Special and Confidential Part', containing proposals for the def-
inite fixing of base-lines around Finnmark'' (Counter-Memorial,
paragraph 104) . In 1913 a confidential Report was made upon the
proposed base-lines on the coasts of the two other provinces con-
cerned. Nordland and Troms (ibidem, paragraph 105). It appears
(ibidem) that the base-points proposed in these confidential Re-
ports are those ultimately adopted by the Decree of 1935; the
confidential Reports were not disclosed until 1950 when they ap-
peared as Annexes 36 and 37 of the Counter-Memorial.
* * *
The Judgment of the Court refers to the Judgment of the Su-
preme Court of Norway in the St. Just case in 1934, in which
that British vessel was condemned for fishing in territorial waters
under the Law of 1906. It is clearly a decision of high authority.
From 1934 onwards, it is conclusive in Norway as to the meaning
of the Decree of 1812 and as to its effect, whether or not it has
been specifically applied to portions of the coast by later Decrees.
But this Court, while bound by the interpretation given in the St.
Just decision of Norwegian internal law, is in no way precluded
from examining the international implications of that law. It is
a well-established rule that a State can never plead a provision of,
or lack of a provision in, its internal law or an act or omission of
its executive power as a defence to a charge that it has violated
international law. This was decided as long ago as in the Geneva
Arbitration of 1870-1871 on the subject of the Alabama Claims,
when the British Government pleaded that it had exercised all the
powers possessed by it under its existing legislation for the pur-
pose of preventing the Alabama from leaving a British port and
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cruising against Federal American shipping, an omission which
cost Great Britain a large sum of money.
The St. Just decision is important in the sense that after the
decision, the existence of a Norwegian system of straight base-
lines cannot be denied either within Norway or on the interna-
tional plane. Only eight years earlier there had occurred the
Deutschland case (a case of an attempt by a German vessel to sell
contraband spirits) (Annex 9 to the Memorial and Annex 47 to
the Counter-Memorial and Annex 31 to the Reply) , in which the
Norwegian Supreme Court, by a majority of 5 to 1, quashed a con-
viction by an inferior Court which had been upheld by the Court
of Appeal. In the Deutschland case, which has now been over-
ruled by the St. Just, it was possible for so distinguished a Nor-
wegian jurist as the late Dr. Raestad (much quoted by both
Parties in this case) to say in the Opinion supplied by him at the
request of the Public Prosecutor that:
"The question arises, however, whether in the present
case the extent of the maritime territory must be deter-
mined from islands, islets and isolated reefs, or—as the
Court of First Instance has done—from imaginary base-
lines drawn between two islands, islets or reefs and, if
necessary, how these base-lines are to be drawn. A dis-
tinction must be made here. On the one hand, the problem
arises whether according to international law a State is
entitled to declare that certain parts of the adjoining sea
fall under its sovereignty in certain—or all—respects.
On the other hand, the question may arise whether a
State under international law, or by virtue of its own
laws, is entitled to consider that its national legislation
in the determined case extends to these same parts of
the adjoining sea when it has not yet been established
that its sovereignty extends that far. A State may have
a certain competence without having made use of it."
and later
"Neither the letters patent [that is, in effect, the
Decree of 1812] nor, if they exist, the supplementary
rules of customary law, prescribe how and between
what islands, islets or rocks the base-lines should be
drawn. . . ."
It does not greatly matter whether Dr. Raestad's views are
right or wrong. What is important, from the point of view of
the notoriety of the Norwegian system of straight base-lines, is
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that, in the year 1926, a lawyer of his standing and possessing his
knowledge of the law governing Norwegian territorial waters
should envisage the possible alternative methods of drawing base-
lines, for the Norwegian contention is that the United Kingdom
must for a long time past have been aware of the Norwegian sys-
tem of straight base-lines connecting the outermost points on
mainland, islands and rocks, and had acquiesced in it.
The following passage occurs in the Deutschland case in the
Judgment of Judge Bonnevie, who delivered the first judgment as
a member of the majority:
"It is also a matter of common knowledge that the
public authorities have claimed, since time immemorial,
certain areas, such as for example the Vestfjord and
the Varangerfjord, as being Norwegian territorial waters
in their entirety, and that the territorial limits should
be drawn on the basis of straight lines at the mouth of
the fjord (sic), regardless of the fact that very great
areas outside the four-mile limit are thus included in
Norwegian territory. But, for the greater part of the
extensive coast of the country, no documents have been
produced to prove that there exist more precise pro-
visions, except for the coast off the country of More, for
which reference is made to the two royal decrees of 1869
and 1889 referred to above."
* * *
Between 1908 and the publication of the Decree of 1935, the
United Kingdom repeatedly asked the Norwegian Government
to supply them with information as to their fishery limits in
northern Norway ; see the Report of the Foreign Affairs Commit-
tee of the Storting dated June 24th, 1935 (Memorial, Annex 15),
which states that: "The British Government have repeatedly re-
quested that the exact limit of this part of the coast should be
fixed so that it might be communicated to the trawler organiza-
tions." The Norwegian reply to these requests has been that the
matter was still under consideration by a Commission or in some
other way, e.g., in the letter of August 11th, 1931, from the
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "the position is that the
Storting have not yet taken up a standpoint with regard to the
final marking of these lines in all details."
The impression that I have formed is that what in the argu-
ment of this case has been called "the Norwegian system" was
in gestation from 1911 onwards, that the St. Just decision of
1934 (overruling the Deutschland decision) marks its first public
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enunciation as a system applicable to the whole coast, and that
the Decree of 1935 is its first concrete application by the Govern-
ment upon a large scale. I find it impossible to believe that it was
in existence as a system at the time of the Deutchland decision of
1926.
* * *
(D) Another ground upon which Norwegian counsel have
sought to justify the Decree of 1935 is that in any case the waters
comprised within the outer lines fixed by that Decree lie well
within the ancient fishing grounds of Norway to which she
acquired a historic title a long time ago.
I think it is true that waters which would otherwise have the
status of high seas can be acquired by a State by means of historic
title, at any rate if contiguous to territorial or national waters;
see Lord Stowell in The Twee Gebroeders (1801), 3 Christopher
Robinson's Admiralty Report 336, 339. But, as he said in that case
:
"Strictly speaking, the nature of the claim brought
forward on this occasion is against the general inclina-
tion of the law ; for it is a claim of private and exclusive
property, on a subject where a general, or at least a com-
mon use is to be presumed. It is a claim which can only
arise on portions of the sea, or on rivers flowing through
different States. ... In the sea, out of the range of
cannon-shot, universal use is presumed. . . . Portions of
the sea are prescribed for. . . . But the general pre-
sumption certainly bears strongly against such exclusive
rights, and the title is a matter to be established, on the
part of those claiming under it, in the same manner as
all other legal demands are to be substantiated, by clear
and competent evidence."
Another rule of law that appears to me to be relevant to the
question of historic title is that some proof is usually required
of the exercise of State jurisdiction, and that the independent
activity of private individauls is of little value unless it can be
shown that they have acted in pursuance of a license or some other
authority received from their Governments or that in some
other way their Governments have asserted jurisdiction through
them.
When the documents that have been submitted in this case in
support of historic title are examined, it appears to me that, with
one exception which I shall mention, they are marked by a lack
of precision as to the waters which were the subject of fishing.
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We get expressions such as "near our fortress of Varshus", "off
the coasts of Finnmark", "the waters off the coast of this country",
"near the land", "fish quite close to the coast", "unlawful fishing
which they have been practising in certain localities", "the waters
of Finnmark", "fjords or their adjacent waters", "whaling in the
waters which wash the coast of Norway and its provinces, in
particular Iceland and the Faroe Islands", etc., etc.
The exception is the case of the licenses granted to Eric Lorch
in the seventeenth century (see Annex 101 to Norwegian Re-
joinder). In 1688 he received a license to fish in, amongst other
places, "the waters ... of the sunken rock of Gjesbaen"; in
1692 he received a license to hunt whales; in 1698 he received
another license to hunt whales, which mentions, among other
places, "the waters ... of the sunken rock of Gjesbaen". The
last two licenses state that it is forbidden to "all strangers and
unlicensed persons to take whales in or without the fjords or their
adjacent waters, within ten leagues from the land."
I do not know precisely where the rock called Gjesbaen or
Gjesbaene is situated, beyond the statement in paragraph 36
of the Counter-Memorial that it is "near the word Alangstaran",
which is marked on the Norwegian Chart 6 (Annex 75 to the Re-
joinder as being outside the outer Norwegian line of the Decree
of 1935. On the same chart of the region known as Lopphavet there
appear to be two fishing-banks called "Ytre Gjesboene" and, south
of it, "Indre Gjesboene", the former being outside the outer line
of th Decree of 1935 and the latter between the outer line
and the base-line of that Decree. What the dimensions of the
fishing-banks are is not clear. The length of the base-line (from
point 20 to 21) which runs in front of Lopphavet is 44 miles, so
that even if the licences formed sufficient evidence to prove a
historic title to a fishing-bank off "the sunken rock of Gjesbaen",
they could not affect so extensive an area as Lopphavet. The three
licenses cover a period of ten years and there is no evidence as
to the duration of the fishery or its subsequent history.
* * *
In these circumstances I consider that the delimitation of ter-
ritorial waters made by the Norwegian Decree of 1935 is in con-
flict with international law, and that its effect will be to injure the
principle of the freedom of the seas and to encourage further
encroachments upon the high seas by coastal States. I regret
therefore that I am unable to concur in the Judgment of the
Court.
(Signed) Arnold D. Mcnair.
a
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B. Abu Dhabi Arbitration Award
1. Note. This Award, reprinted below from 1 I.C.L.Q. 247 (1952), is
included because of its interest as a pioneering discussion of the continental
shelf doctrine. Although not authoritative except as between the parties, it
will be influential because of the distinction of the participants. See Young,
"Lord Asquith and the Continental Shelf," 46 AJ.I.L. (1952), page 512. See,
also, a discussion of the Award by J. Y. Brinton in 8 Revue Egyptienne de
Droit International 114 et seq. (1952). An earlier arbitration raising essen-
tially the same question between the Ruler of Qatar and Petroleum Develop-
ment (Qatar) Ltd. reached the same result in a decision by Lord Radcliffe
as Third Arbitrator but without an accompanying opinion. See Annex II
to a Note on "Problems of the Continental Shelf" (by J. Y. Brinton) in
Ibid., Vol. 6, p. 165 at p. 171 (1950).
2. Text of the Award
In the Matter of An Arbitration between Petroleum Development
(Trucial Coast) Ltd. and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi.
AWARD OF LORD ASQUITH OF BISHOPSTONE
1. On January 11, 1939, Sheikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi, one
of the Trucial States abutting on the Gulf of Persia from the
south and west, entered into a written contract in the Arabic
language with Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.,
whereby the Sheikh purported to transfer to that company the
exclusive right to drill for and win mineral oil within a certain
area in Abu Dhabi. That written agreement contained an arbitra-
tion clause, providing for the reference of disputes arising under
it to arbitration, for the appointment of two arbitrators, and for
the appointment of an umpire in the event of the two arbitrators
being unable to agree. Certain disputes (the nature of which is
indicated more precisely below, but which relate in substance
entirely to the area of the concession) have arisen under this
agreement and were in fact referred to arbitration; the said
arbitrators did differ ; and appointed me as umpire. According to
the terms of the arbitration clause, this, my Award, in respect
of the dispute is final.
1A. Abu Dhabi has a coast line of about 275 miles on the
Gulf. It is bounded on the west by the State of Qatar, and on the
east by the State of Dubai, both much smaller States. These
frontiers, however, were and are to some extent vague. So is its
mainland area, which has been estimated at anything from 10,000
to 26,000 square miles. The main reason for these wide diver-
gences is that the depth of hinterland to be included is indeter-
minate. Abu Dhabi is a large, primitive, poor, thinly populated
country, whose revenue, until oil was discovered, depended mainly
on pearling. It is, like the other Trucial Principalities, a British-
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protected State; that is, its external relations are controlled by
His Majesty. Internally, the Sheikh is an absolute, feudal monarch.
2. The nature of the disputes referred to arbitration and the
subject-matter of this Award are formulated in a letter from the
claimants to the respondent dated July 18, 1949. The letter runs
as follows :
—
'The arbitration is to determine what are the rights
of the Company with respect to all underwater areas
over which the Ruler has or may have sovereignty juris-
diction control or mineral oil rights.
"The Company claims that the area covered by the
Agreement of January 11, 1939 (notably Articles 2 and
3 thereof), includes in addition to the mainland and
islands
:
"(1) All the sea-bed and subsoil under the Ruler's
territorial waters (including the territorial waters of
his islands), and
"(2) All the sea-bed and subsoil contiguous thereto
over which either the Ruler's sovereignty jurisdiction or
control extends or may hereafter extend, or which now
or hereafter may form part of the area over which he has
or may have mineral oil rights."
The issues: The questions referred to arbitration can usefully
be paraphrased by expanding them into four, of which the first
two deal with territorial waters and the second two with the
submarine area outside territorial waters
—
(i) At the time of the agreement of January 11, 1939, did
the respondent—the Sheikh—own the right to win mineral oil
from the subsoil of the sea-bed adjacent to the territorial waters
of Abu Dhabi? (There seems to be no doubt about this.)
(ii) If yes, did he by that agreement transfer such right
to the claimant company?
(iii) At the time of the agreement did he own (or as the
result of a proclamation of 1949 did he acquire) the right to
win mineral oil from the subsoil of any, and, if so, what submarine
area lying outside territorial waters?
(iv) If yes, was the effect of the agreement to transfer such
original or acquired rights to the claimant company? (The Sheikh
in 1949—10 years after this agreement
—
purported to transfer
these last rights to an American company—the "Superior Cor-
poration" : which the Petroleum Development Company claim he
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could not do, since he had already 10 years earlier parted with
these same rights to themselves.)
I would add that the parties requested me to express a view
both on question (iii) and on question (iv), even if owing to the
answer given to one of these questions, the other should become
academic ; and the view expressed upon it at best an obiter dictum.
3. The terms of the agreement: The terms of the agreement
which are mainly relevant to the determination of these questions
are articles 2, 3, 12a, 1 and 17; from which I proceed to quote
certain passages.
4. The agreement having originally been in the Arabic tongue,
considerable differences have arisen as to what is and what is not
an accurate translation. This applies particularly to what is the
most crucial article of all, namely article 2. Although, as will later
appear, the divergences between those translations are not im-
portant, I think I ought for completeness to set out the rival
translations. In the translation originally relied upon by the
claimant company, the wording of article 2 is as follows:
—
"Article 2. (a) The area included in this Agree-
ment is the whole territory subject to the rule of the
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies, and all its
islands and territorial waters. And if in the future there
should be carried out a delimitation of the territory be-
longing to Abu Dhabi, by arrangement with other gov-
ernments, then the area (of this Agreement) shall
coincide with the boundaries provided in such delimita-
tion.
"(b) If in the future a Neutral Zone should be formed
adjacent to the territories of Abu Dhabi and the rights
of rule over such Neutral Zone be shared between the
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and another Ruler, then the Ruler
of Abu Dhabi undertakes that this Agreement shall in-
clude all the mineral oil rights which belong to him in
such Zone.
"(c) The Company shall not undertake any works in
areas used and set apart for places of worship or sacred
buildings or burial grounds."
In the translation of this article relied upon by the respondent,
the Sheikh, the wording is as follows :
—
"Article 2. (a) The area included in this Agreement
is the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the
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Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and all the
islands and the sea waters which belong to that area. And
if in the future the lands which belong to Abu Dhabi are
defined by agreement with other States, then the limits of
the area shall coincide with the limits specified in this
definition.
" (b) If in the future a Neutral Area should be estab-
lished adjacent to the lands of Abu Dhabi and the rights
of rule over such Neutral Area be shared between the
Ruler of Abu Dhabi and another Ruler, then the Ruler
of Abu Dhabi undertakes that this Agreement shall in-
clude what mineral oil rights he has in that area.
"(c) The Company shall not undertake any works in
areas used and set apart for places of worship or sacred
buildings or burial grounds."
Article 3 of the Agreement runs as follows in the translation
relied upon by the claimants
:
"Article 3. The Ruler by this Agreement grants to
the Company the sole right, for a period of 75 solar years
from the date of signature, to search for, discover, drill
for and produce mineral oils and their derivatives and
allied substances within the area, and the sole right to
the ownership of all substances produced, and free dis-
posal thereof both inside and outside the territory : pro-
vided that the export of oil shall be from the territory of
the Concession direct without passing across any adja-
cent territory.
"And it is understood that this Agreement is a grant
of rights over Oil and cannot be considered an Occupa-
tion in any manner whatsoever. ,,
In the translation relied up by the respondent the only differ-
ence is the wholly immaterial one that "dig for" appears in lieu
of "drill for."
Article 12 (a) runs as follows
:
In the translation relied upon by both parties:
—
"Article 12. (a) The Ruler shall have right at any
time to grant to a third party a Concession for any sub-
stances other than those specified in Article 3, on condi-
tion that this shall have no adverse effect on the opera-
tions and rights of the Company."
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Article 1 defines the expression "The Ruler" in the translation
relied upon by both parties as follows:
—
"Article 1. The expression "The Ruler" includes
the present Ruler of Abu Dhabi and its dependencies and
his heirs and successors to whom may in future be en-
trusted the rule of Abu Dhabi."
Article 17 is in these terms
:
In the translation relied upon by the claimants:
—
"Article 17. The Ruler and the Company both de-
clare that they intend to execute this Agreement in a
spirit of good intentions and integrity, and to interpret
it in a reasonable manner. The Company undertakes to
acknowledge the authority of the Ruler and his full
rights as Ruler of Abu Dhabi and to respect it in all
ways, and to fly the Ruler's flag over the Company's
buildings."
In the translation relied upon by the respondents:
—
"Article 17. The Ruler and the Company both de-
clare that they base their ivork in this Agreement on
goodwill and sincerity of belief and on the interpretation
of this Agreement in a fashion consistent with reason.
The Company undertakes to acknowledge the authority of
the Ruler and his full rights as Ruler of Abu Dhabi and to
respect it in all ways, and to fly the Ruler's flag over
the Company's buildings."
The variation between the two translations of Article 17
would seem immaterial.
5... Order in which questions considered:
The order in which I propose to consider the questions raised
by the arbitration is the following:
—
(a) What is the true translation of the Agreement?
(b) What is the "Proper Law" of the Agreement, that is, the
law applicable in interpreting it?
(c) If that law were applied to the bare language of the Agree-
ment, and no regard were paid either (1) to the so-called doctrine
of the "Continental Shelf" or, (2) to the negotiations leading up
to its signature, what construction ought to be placed on those
of its provisions which are the subject-matter of the present
dispute?
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(d) What is the substance and history of the doctrine of the
Continental Shelf?
(e) Is it an established rule of International Law?
(f) If it were, would it operate in any, and if so, what way
to modify the construction of the contract which would prevail
in its absence?
(g) If not, did the negotiations leading up to the execution of
the contract have any such modifying operation?
I will then record my conclusions in paragraph 6.
/ now revert to paragraph 5, taking its subparagraphs in turn.
(a) Translations: I have indicated the two rival translations of
the contract of 1939. There is in this matter little conflict; and
there would probably have been even less but for the circum-
stance that the Arabic of the Gulf, in which the contract is
framed, is an archaic variety of the language, bearing, I was
told, some such relation to modern current Arabic as Chaucer's
English does to modern English. Such discrepancies, however, as
exist between the two translations are fortunately trivial, and the
claimants were willing for purposes of argument to accept the
translation put forward on behalf of the respondent. I therefore
adopt that translation in what follows.
(b) What is the "Proper Law" applicable in construing this
contract? This is a contract made in Abu Dhabi and wholly to be
performed in that country. If any municipal system of law were
applicable, it would prima facie be that of Abu Dhabi. But no such
law can reasonably be said to exist. The Sheikh administers a
purely discretionary justice with the assistance of the Koran;
and it would be fanciful to suggest that in this very primitive
region there is any settled body of legal principles applicable
to the construction of modern commercial instruments. Nor can
I see any basis on which the municipal law of England could
apply. On the contrary, Clause 17 of the agreement, cited above,
repels the notion that the municipal law of any country, as such,
could be appropriate. The terms of that clause invite, indeed pre-
scribe, the application of principles rooted in the good sense and
common practice of the generality of civilised nations—a sort of
"modern law of nature." I do not think that on this point there is
any conflict between the parties.
But, albeit English municipal law is inapplicable as such, some
of its rules are in my view so firmly grounded in reason, as to form
part of this broad body of jurisprudence—this "modern law of
nature." For instance, while in this case evidence has been ad-
mitted as to the nature of the negotiations leading up to, and of
the correspondence both preceding and following the conclusion
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of the agreement, which evidence as material for construing the
contract might, according to domestic English law be largely
inadmissible, and to this extent the rigid English rules have been
disregarded ; yet on the other hand the English rule which attrib-
utes paramount importance to the actual language of the written
instrument in which the negotiations result seems to me no mere
idiosyncrasy of our system, but a principle of ecumenical validity.
Chaos may obviously result if that rule is widely departed from;
and if, instead of asking what the words used mean, the inquiry
extends at large to what each of the parties meant them to mean,
and how and why each phrase came to be inserted.
The same considerations seem to me to apply to the principle
expressio unius est exclusio alterius. I defer entirely to the warn-
ings given by Wills J. and Lopes L.J. in the case of Colquhoun v.
Brooks (19 Q.B.D. 400, at p. 406 ; 21 Q.B.D. 52, at p. 65) , as to the
possibilities (and indeed the frequency) of its misapplication. But
confined within its proper borders it seems to me mere common
sense. (If I have a house and a garden and 200 acres of agricul-
tural land and if I recite this and let to X "my house and garden,"
it seems obvious that the 200 acres are excluded from the lease.)
Much more dubious to my mind is the application to this case
of certain other English maxims relied on by one or the other
party in this case. For instance, verba chartarum fortius ac-
cipiuntur contra proferentem: or the rule that grants by a sover-
eign are to be construed against the grantee. The latter is an
English rule which owes its origin to incidents of our own feudal
polity and royal prerogative which are now ancient history; and
its survival, to considerations which, though quite different, seem
to have equally little relevance to conditions in a protected State
of a primitive order on the Persian Gulf.
(c) The next point for consideration is what construction the
words of the contract (in particular those of articles 2 and 3,
which are crucial) would bear, if (1) no regard were had to the
doctrine of the so-called "Continental Shelf" or "submarine area,"
and (2) no regard were had to the negotiations preceding the
Agreement or to the correspondence accompanying it. It may
help in the first place to brush aside these complicating factors
and consider the bare language of the Agreement itself ; reintro-
ducing the complications at a later stage.
Articles 2 and 3 define the area within which the concession is
to operate and therefore touch the heart of the dispute; which
turns entirely on the extent of that area.
Article 2 opens with the words "The area included in this
Agreement." "Included" for what purpose? This question remits
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us to article 3, which provides that the Ruler of Abu Dhabi grants
to the claimant company the "sole right" for a period of 75 years
to "discover, dig for and produce" mineral oils and their deriva-
tives and allied substances "within the area." The "sole right"
shortly, is a right to win petroleum from the "area" in question.
What area? Turning back to Article 2 we find the area includes
"the whole of the lands which belong to the rule of the Ruler of
Abu Dhabi and their dependencies." The sentence does not end
there. It goes on with the words "and all the islands and sea waters
which belong to that area."
What does the word "and" mean in this connection? In its most
natural sense it surely means "plus." It introduces an addendum
to something which has gone before. (I discuss an alternative
meaning suggested for it below) . But if it simply means "plus,"
then the expression "the whole of the lands which belong to the
rule of the Ruler" cannot be read literally ; for read literally that
phrase would include in any case the islands, and probably the
territorial waters, and it would not be necessary or sensible to
make these items addenda. On this meaning of "and," the "land"
must be limited to the mainland (no doubt excluding inland or
landlocked waters in an indented coast) . What, on this basis, does
the second addendum mean? viz., "the sea waters which belong
to that area?" Placing oneself in th year 1939 and banishing from
one's mind the subsequent emergence of the doctrine of the
"Shelf" and everything to do with the negotiations, I should have
thought this expression could only have been intended to mean the
territorial maritime belt in the Persian Gulf, which is a three-
mile belt; together with its bed and subsoil, since oil is not won
from salt water. In what other sense at that time could sea
waters be said to "belong" to a littoral power or to the "rule of
the Ruler?" In point of fact, that is the meaning the claimant
company were asserting for the expression as late as March,
1949, ten whole years after the contract (see letter page 86A
of the Correspondence)
.
Even if "and" had a different signification, not cumulative but
epexegetic, such as "and mark you, in case you are in doubt, I
include in the 'lands' the islands and sea waters which belong
to the area," I should still hold, in the absence of what I have
termed the two complicating factors, that the Concession covered
the sea-bed and subsoil of the territorial belt. Nothing less. The
only question would be whether it covered more.
Conclusion as to territorial waters' subsoil: I therefore hold or
find that the subsoil of the territorial belt is included in the
Concession. Neither the ambiguity, if any, of the word "and"
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nor any of the considerations dealth with hereafter affect this
conclusion. In particular I cannot accept the argument put for-
ward for the respondent that sea waters are merely "included" as
a means of access to dry land, whether mainland or insular. To
read the word "included," in the Concession, as meaning in the
case of the mainland and islands "included as petroliferous areas"
:
and to read it in relation to the "sea waters" as something totally
different, namely, "included as means of access to the petroliferous
areas," seems to me unjustifiable, if not perverse.
I am not impressed by the argument that there was in 1939 no
word for "territorial waters" in the language of Abu Dhabi, or
that the Sheikh was quite unfamiliar with that conception. Mr.
Jourdain had none the less been talking "prose" all his life because
the fact was only brought to his notice somewhat late. Every State
is owner and sovereign in respect of its territorial waters, their
bed and subsoil, whether the Ruler has read the works of Bynker-
shoek or not. The extent of the Ruler's Dominion cannot depend
on his accomplishments as an international jurist.
So far affirmatively. Negatively (still leaving aside what I have
called the complicating factors) I should certainly in 1939 have
read the expression "the sea waters which belong to that area"
not only as including, but as limited to, the territorial belt and
its subsoil. At that time neither contracting party had ever heard
of the doctrine of the Continental Shelf, which as a legal doctrine
did not then exist. No thought of it entered their heads. None such
entered that of the most sophisticated jurisconsult, let alone the
"understanding" perhaps strong but "simple and unschooled" of
Trucial Sheikhs.
Directed, as I apprehend I am, to apply a simple and broad
jurisprudence to the construction of this contract, it seems to
me that it would be a most artificial refinement to read back into
the contract the implications of a doctrine not mooted till seven
years later, and, if the view which I am about to express is sound,
not even today admitted to the canon of international law. How-
ever, the time has now come to consider this doctrine more
narrowly.
(d) The doctrine of the Continental Shelf, its substance and
history: The expression "Continental Shelf" was first used by a
geographer in 1898. 1 The legal doctrine which later gathered
round this geographical term was possibly foreshadowed when in
1942 England and Venezuela concluded a treaty about the Gulf
1 It made a fleeting appearance on the legal stage in 1916 : but passed over
it with "printless feet."
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of Paria providing for spheres of influence in respect of areas
covered by the high seas and followed by certain annexations
coincident with these spheres. The doctrine was perhaps first
explicitly asserted as a legal doctrine (in a very exaggerated form)
in a proclamation by the Argentine Republic in 1944, but its clas-
sical enunciation in the form in which it has mainly to be con-
sidered in this case was the well-known proclamation by President
Truman of September 28, 1945.
The substance of the doctrine then proclaimed, as I understand
it, was this : A coastal power is not surrounded, even at low water,
by a precipice leading vertically to the bottom of the ocean, per-
haps two miles below. As a rule the sea-bed shelves very gently
outwards and downwards for a considerable distance, a distance
generally (but not invariably) exceeding the three-mile terri-
torial limit. 2 Again, not always but very often, where the sea
reaches a depth of about 100 fathoms or (what is much the same
thing) 200 metres, the edge of this shelf is reached and there is
a more or less abrupt plunge of the land-mass down to the ocean
floor. The doctrine of the "Shelf" as proclaimed in the Truman
Declaration of 1945 arrogated to the United States "jurisdiction
and control" over "the resources" of the American Continental
Shelf which was described as "appertaining" to the United States.
The resources referred to were those of the subsoil of that zone
of the sea-bed which lies between the limit of the territorial waters
and the point at which its gently shelving character gives place
to an abrupt descent. 3
Several other States followed roughly the same course as the
United States. For instance, Great Britain (not quite on the same
lines) in respect of Jamaica and of the Bahamas, and Saudi
Arabia in respect of parts of the Persian Gulf. Other States
weighed in with similar claims. These other States fall into two
groups ; I. Mexico and the Latin and Central American Republics,
and II. The States which are most directly relevant in this Arbitra-
tion—States bordering on the Persian Gulf other than Saudi
Arabia.
2 If I speak of the three-mile limit and of the Territorial Maritime Belt
interchangeably, this is only for brevity. I am aware that some States claim
more than a three-mile belt, but about 80 per cent of the merchant shipping
in the world is registered in "three-mile" countries; and this is the width of
territorial waters on the Persian Gulf.
3 It does not seem to make any difference for the present purpose whether
as a matter of geological fact the Shelf was built up by erosion of material
from the unsubmerged portion and by its sedimentation, or whether the Shelf
was originally there in a denuded state and was subsequently submerged
by what is poetically called the "transgression of the seas."
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In almost every case the claim was embodied in a decree or
proclamation. Most often, though not invariably, the proclamation
was in a "declaratory" form, that is in a form asserting or imply-
ing that the proclamation was not constitutive of a new right but
merely recorded the existence of a pre-existing one. 4
I. The claims of the Latin and Central American Republics
were often far more ambitious than those of this country, the
United States and Saudi Arabia; inasmuch as on the one hand
the former claims were often claims to actual sovereignty over the
Shelf and its subsoil 5 and on the other hand, and this is more
important, the claims were often not limited to the Shelf as a
geological entity or even to the area ending where the depth of the
sea began to exceed 100 fathoms, but sometimes extended to a
zone 200 nautical miles from the mainland; an area quite unre-
lated to the width of the physical Shelf. 6 In these exorbitant forms
the claims met with protest and resistance ; but in the more modest
form in which they were advanced by the United States, the United
Kingdom and Saudi Arabia, they were acquiesced in by the gen-
erality of Powers, or at least not actively gainsaid by them.
II. The British Persian Gulf Proclamations: The proclamation
of Saudi Arabia was followed in 1949 by proclamations issued by
the Sheikhs of the Trucial States (or on their behalf by the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom qua protecting Power) including
the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. All of these last proclamations conform
broadly in their terms to the Truman proclamation. They mostly
contain recitals on the following lines: "Whereas it is just that
the sea-bed and subsoil extending to a reasonable distance from
the coast should appertain to and be controlled by the littoral
State to which it is adjacent." The Abu Dhabi proclamation of
June 10, 1949, provides in its operative part "We, Shakhbut Bin
Sultan Bin Za'id, Ruler of Abu Dhabi, hereby declare that the sea-
bed and subsoil lying beneath the high seas in the Persian Gulf con-
tiguous to the territorial waters of Abu Dhabi and extending
seaward to boundaries to be determined more precisely as occa-
4 Declaratory : see, for instance, the proclamations of Saudi Arabia, May
28, 1949, of the Trucial States including Abu Dhabi of June 10, 1949; the
Truman proclamation of 1945, though its language is not on this point wholly-
free from ambiguity: and contrast with these proclamations the language
of the United Kingdom proclamations in the case of the Bahamas, November
27, 1949; Jamaica, November 26, 1948; and of the Falkland Islands, De-
cember 21, 1950, all of which employ somewhat annexatory language such as
"the boundaries" of the Colony "are hereby extended": language "constitu-
tive" of rather than merely declaratory of the rights involved.
5 As in the case of Argentina 1944, Mexico 1945 and Chile 1947.
6 As in the case of Chile, El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica.
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sion arises on equitable principles by us after consultation with the
neighboring states appertain to the land of Abu Dhabi and are
subject to its exclusive jurisdiction and control."
(e) Is the doctrine in any of its forms part and parcel of inter-
national laiv?: The preceding section calls attention not only to
the recent origin of the doctrine but to the great variety of forms
which in its short life it has assumed. Some States claim sover-
eignty over the Shelf. Others pointedly avoid doing so, claiming
only "jurisdiction" or "control," "appurtenance" and the like.
Whatever the scope of the rights claimed, some States assert
those rights by declaratory proclamations implying their pre-
existence; others issue proclamations which are on the face of
them a new departure and designed to be constitutive of title.
What is the seaward limit of the Shelf? Here again the answers
given differ. Some States say, "its geological or geographical
limit, its 'edge' or its 'drop'." Others (whether because their par-
ticular Shelf has got no edge and has got no drop, or for other
reasons), say, "the point at which the sea becomes 100 fathoms or
200 metres deep" ; while yet others say, "a line drawn parallel to
the coast of the contiguous power and 200 nautical miles from it."
The 200-mile claim seems to be more or less universally discredited.
The other two criteria seem on their face much more reasonable.
But what is the position where as in the Persian Gulf itself, both
of these more reasonable criteria fail us, because the Shelf not
only has no edge, but extends continuously across a sea whose
waters never attain a depth of as much as 100 fathoms? Is it to
extend outwards to a "reasonable distance" from the coast—the
expression used in the recital of the Abu Dhabi proclamation? If
so, what is a "reasonable distance"? Where States are grouped,
as in this case, round a more or less cylindrical gulf, is the prin-
ciple "usque ad medium filum" applicable? How could it possibly
be applied in the case of comparably shallow seas of completely
irregular configuration, such as the North Sea? Again how are
rights of whatever character to the subsoil of the Shelf acquired ?
Can they indeed be acquired at all? Or would their existence in-
evitably conflict with the "freedom" of the high seas? Before the
doctrine of the Shelf was promulgated I think the general answer
might well have been that they cannot be acquired at all—that the
Shelf is as inappropriable as the high seas that roll or repose
above it: subject to this reservation, that the sea-bed (not the
subsoil) of the submarine area, is in certain rare cases, sub-
ject to a customary right vested in certain States to conduct
"sedentary" fisheries in such sea-bed. For instance, the right to
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fish for sponges, coral, oysters, pearls and chank. 7 Indeed, the
shallow seas of the Persian Gulf are subject to mutual pearling
rights by subjects of the various littoral States. If, however, the
submarine area is capable not merely of being the subject-matter
of these limited occupational rights over the sea-bed, and pro
tanto a "res nullius/' is its subsoil as a whole res nullius? that is
to say, something in which rights can be acquired, but only by
effective occupation? Or is the position, as the claimants' main
argument maintains, that the rights in the subsoil of the Shelf
adhere (and must be taken always to have adhered) ipso jure—
occupation or no occupation—to the contiguous coastal Power? Or
failing that, if occupation be indeed necessary ; in cases where it is
almost impracticable, may proclamations, or similar acts be
treated as a constructive or symbolic or inchoate occupation (the
claimants' alternative contention under this head) ?
Conclusion as to doctrine of the Continental Shelf: Neither the
practice of nations nor the pronouncements of learned jurists give
any certain or consistent answer to many
—
perhaps most—of these
questions. I am of opinion that there are in this field so many
ragged ends and unfilled blanks, so much that is merely tentative
and exploratory, that in no form can the doctrine claim as yet to
have assumed hitherto the hard lineaments or the definitive status
of an established rule of international law.
Whether there ought to exist a rule giving effect to the doctrine
in one or other and, if so, which of its forms is another question
and one which, if I had to answer it, I should answer in the affirma-
tive. There seems to me much cogency on the arguments of those
who advocate the ipso jure variant of the doctrine. In particular
:
(1) it is extremely desirable that someone, in what threatens to
become an oil-starved world, should have the right to exploit the
subsoil of the submarine area outside the territorial limit; (2) the
contiguous coastal Power seems the most appropriate and con-
venient agency for this purpose. It is in the best position to exer-
cise effective control, and the alternatives teem with disadvan-
tages; (3) there is no reason in principle why the subsoil of the
high seas should, like the high seas themselves, be incapable of
being the subject of exclusive rights in any one. The main reasons
why this status is attributed to the high seas is (i) that they are
the great highways between nations and navigation of these high-
ways should be unobstructed, (ii) That fishing in the high seas
7 An incompletely, sedentary crustacean. I gathered from Professor Waldock
that a chank moves very slowly: epur si muove: on this whole subject Sir
Cecil Hurst's Paper read to the Grotius Society in 1948 is the locus classicus.
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should be unrestricted (a policy approved by this country ever
since Magna Carta abolished "several" fisheries). The subsoil,
however, of the submarine area is not a highway between nations
and the installations necessary to exploit it (even though sunk
from the surface into the subsoil rather than tunnelled laterally)
need hardly constitute an appreciable obstacle to free navigation
;
nor does the subsoil contain fish. (4) To treat this subsoil as res
nullius—"fair game" for the first occupier—entails obvious and
grave dangers so far as occupation is possible at all. It invites
a perilous scramble. The doctrine that occupation is vital in the
case of a res nullius has in any case worn thin since the East
Greenland Arbitration and more especially since that relating
to Clipperton Island. But leaving that aside, it is difficult to
imagine any arrangement more calculated to produce international
friction than one which entitles nation A, it may be thousands
of miles from nation B, to stake out claims in the Continental
Shelf contiguous to nation B by "squatting" on B's doorstep
—
at some point just outside nation B's territorial water limit.
The question just considered, namely not what is but what
ought to be the rule, is not so irrelevant as it might at first
sight appear, for the following reason: the International Law
Commission appointed by the United Nations with M. Francois
as Rapporteur, has been investigating the doctrine and problems
of the Continental Shelf. This body has made a number of
reports of great interest and importance including a draft code
contained in the Report of the Third Session of the International
Law Commission (A-CN 4-48) consisting of some six or seven
short articles of which I will quote the first three.
Article 1. "As here used the term 'Continental Shelf
'
refers to the sea-bed and subsoil of the submarine areas
contiguous to the coast but outside the areas of terri-
torial waters where the depth of the superjacent waters
admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the sea-bed and subsoil."
Article 2. "The Continental Shelf is subject to the
exercise by the coastal state of control and jurisdiction
for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural
resources."
Article 3. "The exercise by a coastal state of control
and jurisdiction over the Continental Shelf does not
affect the legal status of the superjacent waters as high
seas."
These draft Articles have been prayed in aid by the claimants
with the implication that they are, or are intended to be the
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expression of principles which are already part of international
law, not merely of principles which ought to, or might with
advantage, form part of that law in future. If this is indeed the
contention of the claimants, I am of opinion that it is ill-founded.
It is clear that the Codifying Commission of the International
Law Commission is charged with two distinct functions, (1) that
of recording existing rules of international law, and (2) that of
indicating what the law should be
;
promoting as the phrase runs,
"the progressive development of international law" by preparing
; draft conventions on "subjects which have not yet been regulated
\ by international law, or in regard to which the law has not yet
been sufficiently developed in the practice of States." It seems to
me clear that these Articles were framed in the discharge, not
of the first but of the second, of these functions. As the Com-
mission in paragraph 6 of its commentary on Article 2 says : "The
Commission has not attempted to base on customary law the
j
right of a State to exercise control and jurisdiction for the limited
,
purposes stated in Article 2, and though numerous proclamations
i have been issued over the past decade it can hardly be said that
such unilateral action has already established a new customary
law." 8
8 In respect of this interpretation of the suggested Articles
—
viz., as recom-
mendations rather than records—the following United Nations documents are
relevant; besides A-CN. 4-48 of 1951 itself (the suggested Articles and
commentary thereon) , A-CN. 4-Sr. Q6, 67, 68 and 69 (these last constituting
the Summary Record of the meetings of the Second Session of the Interna-
tional Law Commission, 1950). Perhaps I may make this footnote the vehicle
for an expression of gratitute to those who addressed me, for bringing to
:
my notice some of the voluminous literature, articles, addresses and other
publications—by experts on the Continental Shelf. Those from which I have
derived the most instruction include:
(1) Prof. H. Lauterpacht's article entitled "Sovereignty over Submarine
Areas," which is likely to be published in the British Year Book of Interna-
tional Law, Vol. 27, 1950, pp. 376-433, almost simultaneously with this
Award.
(2) Professor Waldock's article "The Legal Basis of Claims to the Con-
tinental Shelf" (to appear in Transactions of the Grotius Society, Vol. 36,
1950)
,
previously printed as a paper submitted to the Copenhagen Conference
i of the International Law Association, 1950.
(3) Mr. Richard Young's article, "The Legal Status of Submarine Areas
beneath the High Seas," published in the American Journal of International
I Law, Vol. 45, 1951, April, pp. 225-249.
(4) The Memorandum of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on
the Regime of the High Seas—2nd Session (1950) of the International Law
Commission (A-CN. 4-32)
.
(5) The works of Sir Arnold McNair passim; my debt to which is too
diffused to be particularised by chapter and verse.
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I therefore cannot accept these Articles as recording, or even
purporting to record, established rules : and if they do not, if they
are mere recommendations as to what such rules might with
advantage be, if adopted by International Convention, they clearly
cannot affect the construction of the contract of 1939. (f ) Pausing
here before dealing with the last question, viz., the effect, if any of
the negotiations on the meaning of the contract; and considering
only the possible effect on the construction of the contract of the
doctrine of the Shelf; I would summarise as foPows the claim-
ant's argument and my conclusions about it: The claimant's pri-
mary contention is (1) that the doctrine of the Shelf is settled
law, (2) that it always was so, and therefore that it was so in
1939 ; ergo, the meaning which some of the expressions in the
contract would or might otherwise have borne is enlarged by
the inclusion therein of the Shelf. For instance, in Article 2 either
the expression "the whole of the lands which belong to the rule
of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi" or the expression "and the sea waters
which belong to that area," are so enlarged by the inclusion
of an area in this case measuring over 10,000 square miles of
extraterritorial marine subsoil. The argument falls to the ground
if I am right in rejecting the premiss on which it rests, namely,
that the doctrine of the Shelf has become and, indeed, was already
in 1939, part of the corpus of international law.
Again, if I am right in rejecting that premiss, the second way
in which they put their case also fails; here they rely on the
proviso to Article 2 which says that "If in future the lands
which belong to Abu Dhabi are defined by agreement with other
States, then the limits of the area" (of the Concession) "shall
coincide with the limits specified in this definition." The argument
is that the Concession is by these words expressly to extend to
any after-acquired area of Abu Dhabi, and that the effect of the
proclamations of 1949, if not retrospective, cannot be less than
to add the Shelf to the area originally covered as from the date
when the proclamations were promulgated. This argument also
fails if I am right in thinking that the premiss on which it rests
is invalid; but I think it would fail independently of that since
there has been no definition of anything "by agreement with other
States," and I should have thought in any case that the definition
referred to was limited to one affecting dry land, whether epirot
or insular.
Lastly :
—
(g) The Negotiations: Did the negotiations attending the
conclusion of the contract operate to modify what I have held
to be the construction which the contract would bear if there
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had been no such negotiations? I do not find it possible to base
any firm conclusion under this head on the use of Arabic words
such as "ard" or "aradi" or "mantiqua" in the negotiations lead-
ing up to the Agreement, nor on the fact that the price offered
for options for oil concessions to the various Trucial Sheikhs
from 1935 onwards till 1939 were proportioned not to any square
mileage which included marine areas, but only to the length of
the respective coast lines; although it is clear that marine areas
were at this stage quite outside the contemplation of the parties.
Some evidence was given as to oral interchanges between the
Sheikh on the one hand and Mr. Lermitte and Brigadier Longrigg
on the other in the last fortnight or so before the contract was
signed. The Sheikh in his evidence said, I doubt not in perfect
good faith, that the meaning of the expression "the sea waters
belonging to that area" was never discussed with him at all.
The two witnesses for the company say that it was; they said
that they explained that the territorial water belt of three miles
would be included prima facie in the Concession, but added that
the Sheikh then claimed that he ruled the waters leading out
from the coast to islands, 50, or one of them even 100, miles out
from the shore : and that it was in deference to this claim of the
Sheikh's that the formula "and the sea waters belonging to that
area" was inserted.
I am clearly of opinion and find as a fact that the Sheikh's
recollection was at fault in so far as he said that the phrase in
question was never mentioned in the negotiations. Mr. Lermitte
and Brigadier Longrigg cannot have imagined the discussion to
which they testified. They were excellent witnesses in point both
of integrity and accuracy; although under the latter head one
cannot forget that they, like the Sheikh, were testifying to events
12 years old. I think it more probable than not that the Sheikh
did claim to rule coastal seas outside the three-mile limit. It is
not the custom of Oriental potentates to minimise the extent
of their dominions ; but having regard particularly to subsequent
correspondence it seems to me far more probable that this was,
and was taken by the claimants to be, a rhetorical flourish than
Ithat it was either intended or treated at the time as a sober con-
tractual stipulation. In a similar vein we say, "Britannia rules
ithe waves." We do not expect to be taken literally. If we were,
we should be challenging the doctrine of the freedom of the
jseas.
Certainly there is nothing in the correspondence for a whole
10 years or more after the contract to suggest that the company
attached any binding contractual quality to this statement, assum-
154
ing it was made. As late as March 9, 1949 (p. 84a of the cor-
respondence) the company were claiming no more (apart from
the mainland and islands) than the territorial three-mile belt.
On March 24, 1949, however, a controversial discussion (recorded
at p. 87 and the following pages of the correspondence) occurs
between Mr. Lermitte and the Sheikh on which some such claim
is raised for the first time. The Sheikh is contending that the com-
pany have no right under the Agreement to drill in any part of
the sea bed even in the territorial zone. Mr. Lermitte replies,
"It is recognised universally that the boundaries of any country
situated on the sea extend automatically three miles into the sea.
This is what is called 'territorial watersV , In the latter part of
this interview as recorded, Mr. Lermitte for the first time claims
more submerged land than that covered by territorial waters,
and this does not appear to be expressly challenged by the
Sheikh (p. 88, sub-p. 3) : but Brigadier Longrigg even as late
as March 25, 1949, in a letter from London is only mooting in a
very tentative fashion the view that where "exclusive rights
are granted to a company in respect of the whole of a State
including its territorial waters then the company is entitled to
the same rights in respect of the subsoil of the Continental Shelf
appertaining to that State" (p. 89). If Brigadier Longrigg had
had a clear express promise of a contractual order from the
Sheikh of rights in respect of the subsoil in the sea for 50 or a 100
miles out from the coast, no halting tentative and ex post facto
recourse to the Shelf doctrine would have been needed. He would
have had an express undertaking valid without reference to that
doctrine, and would have said so.
For these reasons I am of opinion that the prima facie con-
struction of the Agreement, which in my view excludes from the
Concession the Shelf, is not modified so as to include it by the
negotiations incident to the Agreement any more than by the
(in my view incompletely established) doctrine of the Shelf
itself.
6. Conclusions and award: It follows, if I am right, that the
claimants succeed as to the subsoil of the territorial waters (in-
cluding the territorial waters of islands) and that the Sheikh
succeeds as to the subsoil of the Shelf; by which I mean in this
connection the submarine area contiguous with Abu Dhabi out-
side the territorial zone; viz., the former is included in the Con-
cession and the latter is not; and I award and declare to that
effect.
I would only add in conclusion a word about the Qatar Arbi-
tration over which Lord Radcliffe presided. I have reached a
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result in this case which happens closely to correspond with that
reached by Lord Radcliffe in that case, on other facts and a dif-
ferent Agreement. There is, in fact, little connection between the
two Arbitrations if only because in the Qatar Agreement there
was no allusion in the contract to "sea waters" at all. If Lord
Radcliffe instead of merely recording his conclusions had ex-
pounded the principles on which he had reached them, I should
have derived invaluable and authoritative guidance from such an
exposition; but as he took the course he did, I am to that extent
inops consilii, and have only departed from his (perhaps more
prudent) method and gone into general principles at the express
invitation of the parties ; to whose legal representatives I would
wish to express my deep indebtedness.
(Signed) Asquith of Bishopstone.
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